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INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOMA CONSTITUTIONAL MISCONCEPTION:
DID GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
PERPETUATE THE CONFUSION?
RICHARD H. HIERS*

Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in [academic
freedom] is somewhat troubling. Both the medical school in Bakke and,
in our case, the [University of Texas] law school are state institutions.
The First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of
government, not government from its citizens.I
Four decades ago, the Supreme Court identified the academic freedom of
individual faculty in public colleges and universities as an especially important
value protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, in recent years, some
lower federal court decisions have asserted that colleges and universities
themselves are somehow entitled to First Amendment academic freedom. One
Court of Appeals has held that such institutional academic freedom counter-

balances, and thus effectively trumps or nullifies, individual faculty academic
claims. Another Circuit has gone so far as to declare, en banc, that only academic
institutions have academic freedom rights under the First Amendment, and that

individual faculty members neither have, nor ever have had, such rights.
Several commentators in recent years have stated that the Supreme Court has
held that public colleges and universities themselves are entitled to academic

* Affiliate Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Florida. Member: Florida Bar, Public
Interest Law Section; Bar of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas; Bar Ass'n
of the Fifth Federal Circuit. Former law clerk with Judge Jerre S. Williams, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Federal Circuit. The writer wishes to thank the Fredric G. Levin College of
Law of the University of Florida for research support, and the William W. Knight Law Center of
the University of Oregon, and particularly Dr. Dennis R. Hyatt, Director of its John E. Jaqua
Library, and the staff of the Carl R. Hertig Computer Laboratory, for assistance and use of
facilities during preparation of this article. Special thanks also to the following for comments and
suggestions regarding issues considered in this article: Rebecca H. Hiers, Esq., Mediator, Sunrise
Mediation, Pendleton, Oregon; Professor Joseph W. Little, Levin College of Law of the
University of Florida; Professor John H. Robinson at Notre Dame Law School; and the
anonymous referee from the Journalof College and University Law. The writer, alone, of course,
is responsible for any and all errors.
1. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996) (opinion by Smith, J.). In the
Fifth Circuit, this case is known as "Hopwood II." Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d. 256, 260-61
(5th Cir. 2000) ("Hopwood lI7').
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freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment. Language in a number of Court
opinions can be read to support this view. The Supreme Court, however, has never
actually so held. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine how institutional academic
freedom could be grounded upon the First Amendment by any kind of
straightforward constitutional analysis. Significantly, no federal court has ever
shown how that might be done. Yet, the theory persists. Recently certain amicus
curiae briefs before the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger2 urged the Justices to hold
that a state university's law school had a First Amendment academic freedom right
to establish admission standards. In the course of its opinion deciding Grutter, a
majority of the Court repeated language from an earlier concurring opinion
purportedly identifying such a right. Did the Grutter majority thereby intend to
give its imprimatur to the theory of institutional academic freedom under the First
Amendment? Or did the majority merely refer to this theory in dicta, as part of its
discussion of problematic judicial language in the earlier opinion?
Language in both earlier Court opinions, and the majority's opinion in Grutter,
leave it uncertain as to the Court's understanding of certain critical terms and
concepts. In some cases, Justices use the terms "academic freedom" and
"autonomy" interchangeably. It is occasionally uncertain whether they mean to
say that academic freedom attributed to public colleges or universities is a First
Amendment interest, or an important social policy value. Judicial opinions
referring to academic freedom or autonomy as First Amendment interests or rights
sometimes fail to make clear whether such rights or interests inhere in the
respective institutions' faculties, whose actions had been challenged, or in the
institutions themselves.
This article begins with a review of language that eventually gave rise to the
concept of institutional academic freedom, and includes a summary of lower court
decisions embracing that concept or notion. The second part identifies certain
constitutional problems in connection with the idea that institutional academic
freedom can somehow be derived from or based upon the First Amendment. The
third part describes and analyzes language in the Court's Grutter decision,
language that may or may not have the effect of validating the concept of
institutional academic freedom under the First Amendment.
Various Justices from time to time have characterized institutional academic
freedom as a First Amendment value. Such characterization, however, has not
been, and probably cannot be, sustained on the basis of constitutional law. The
article concludes with another suggestion, that the courts may, and in proper
circumstances should, acknowledge the important public policy value of
institutional autonomy in matters requiring educational expertise. While such
autonomy might well be entitled to judicial deference, especially when plausibly
presented as an important state interest, it is not an interest that can be protected by
the First Amendment.

2.

539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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I. THE PECULIAR ORIGINS AND STRANGE CAREER OF THE IDEA OF "INSTITUTIONAL
ACADEMIC FREEDOM"

As will be shown, institutional academic freedom is not so much a theory as an
accident, or rather, the product of a series of accidents or unexplained incidents. In
quite general terms, what happened was as follows. A distinguished Justice, in a
concurring opinion, happened to quote as persuasive authority from a South
African book that referred to the "freedoms of a university."'3 Twenty-one years
later, another Justice, also in a concurring opinion, quoted from the earlier
quotation, and declared that the freedoms there mentioned constitute academic
freedom, adding-without explanation-that the First Amendment somehow under
girded that freedom.4 The next year, a federal district court, without citing any
authority for the proposition, announced in dicta that there was such a thing as
institutional academic freedom, and that this freedom could be set in opposition to
faculty academic freedom. 5 In time, the Seventh and Fourth Circuits established
(to their own satisfaction) the doctrine of institutional academic freedom based
upon one or both of the earlier Supreme Court concurrences, as if these had
somehow been transmogrified into majority holdings, and as if this doctrine was or
6
somehow could be grounded upon the First Amendment.
A. The Open Universities in South Africa

Core language, found in virtually all judicial opinions referring to the matter,
derives, somewhat oddly, from a book published in South Africa in 1957, The
Open Universities in South Africa.7 Because of the significance later ascribed to it,
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra Part I.D.1.
6. See infra Part I.D.3, 5, 6. This article does not attempt to describe or analyze the nature,
history, or scope of academic freedom as a professional standard, social policy value, or First
Amendment right or interest inherent in public college and university faculty, public school
teachers, and possibly students and administrators. Classic studies of these important topics
include Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 431 (1963); THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970); and the several symposia articles published in 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247-1659
(1988); and 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-418 (1990). The basic professional standard is the
1940 Statement on Principlesof Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS
& REPORTS 3-4 (9th ed. 2001).
Important studies of so-called institutional academic freedom include Matthew W.
Finkin, On 'Institutional' Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817 (1983); J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989);
David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?, 87 ACADEME 16 (Nov.-Dec.
2001); David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom under the FirstAmendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990); and Terrence
Leas & Charles J. Russo, Waters v. Churchill: Autonomy for the Academy or Freedomfor the
Individual,93 EDUC. L. REP. 1099 (1994). The issue is also discussed in several of the recent taw
journal articles cited infra note 129.
7. CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIV. OF
THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SouTH AFRICA (Albert van de Sandt
Centlivres et al. eds., Johannesburg: Witwatersrand Univ. Press 1957) [hereinafter CENTLIVRES].
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the book's much-quoted language is described in its original setting. The authors,
faculty members at two South African universities which previously had been, and
at the time still were, open to students of all racial categories, wrote in opposition
to the South African government's plan to bar admission of non-whites at these
universities as part of that government's apartheid program. The authors wrote,
inter alia:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
8
admitted to study.
This language does not mention academic freedom. Nor do the authors elsewhere
identify these "freedoms of a university" with academic freedom. The first page of
the first chapter, which describes "The South African University System," suggests
that the authors may have been thinking of the importance of university autonomy:
Each university is a corporate body established by an Act of Parliament
which endows the Council with general control of all the affairs of the
university, and endows the [university] Senate with specific powers in
academic matters. This is a system of university autonomy under which
each university is free to choose its own staff to decide the nature of its
curricula and to select its own students from among those who are
academically qualified.9
The aspects of university autonomy italicized are virtually identical to the
institutional functions characterized in the segment from the same publication
above as "the four essential freedoms of a university." The authors, themselves
faculty members, did not distinguish between a university and its faculty or Senate.
Elsewhere, the authors express concern that imposition of apartheid would
adversely affect both university autonomy and faculty academic freedom.10 At the
time, South Africa had no constitutional safeguards similar to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.II In the South African context,

For a more detailed account, see Richard Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty
Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L.
35, 45-55(2002).
8. CENTLIVRES, supra note 7, at 11-12. The authors quote the expression "the four
essential freedoms" from an address by another South African scholar. See Hiers, supra note 7, at
53 n.104.
9. CENTLIVRES, supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis added).
10. "The open universities declare that legislative enforcement of academic segregation on
racial grounds is an unwarranted interference with university autonomy and academic freedom."
Id. at 5. Elsewhere, the authors refer to academic freedom in terms of the importance of
unfettered search for truth, and freedom of thought and expression on the part of individual
members of the university communities. See Hiers, supra note 7, at 52-55.
11. See CENTLIVRES, supra note 7, at 43. See also infra notes 44-45. This point is
emphasized here because it seems to have been ignored or forgotten in many later instances when
judges appropriated the language quoted suprain the text accompanying note 8.
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both university autonomy and academic freedom were necessarily social or public
policy values, not constitutional interests. Moreover, of course, there would have
been no way the authors could have grounded either university autonomy or
academic freedom on constitutional jurisprudence in the United States. Their
concern was to urge that these traditional and highly valued academic procedures
not be subverted by the South African government's proposed program of
educational apartheid. There was no question of the universities' freedoms or
autonomy being somehow in conflict with their faculties' academic freedom.
B. Justice Frankfurter's Concurring Opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire
The Open Universities language quoted above 12 first entered the jurisprudence
of federal courts in a concurring opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire.13 Paul Sweezy had declined to answer various questions put to
him by the state's Attorney General regarding lectures he had given at the
University of New Hampshire.' 4 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that the
state had violated Sweezy's academic freedom. 15 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
quoted from The Open Universities as one of several then recent scholarly
statements regarding the perils of "government intervention in the intellectual life
of a university."' 16 Because it is quoted or cited in nearly every judicial opinion
referring to institutional academic freedom, the following portion of Justice
Frankfurter's quotation is again repeated here:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
17
study.
In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter neither characterized the "four essential
freedoms of a university" as "academic freedom" or "academic freedoms," nor did
he indicate that these four freedoms were somehow based upon the First
Amendment. Necessarily, Justice Frankfurter would have realized that he was
quoting The Open Universities to illustrate sound social policy, not as binding
authority. The expression, "[i]t is the business of a university to provide,"
indicates that he meant to endorse the view that a university itself has the

12. See supratext accompanying note 8.
13. 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Harlan, J.).
14. Id. at 238-44.
15. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ.).
"We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the area of
academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread." Id.The petitioner was Sweezy, not the university where he had lectured.
16. Id. at 262.
17. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing CENTLIVRES, supra note 7, at 10-12).
Justice Frankfurter did not say whether such determinations were to be made by university
faculty, by administration, or by both.
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responsibility to provide for and protect scholarly "speculation, experiment" and
creativity, as well as "the four essential freedoms" so that they might be carried on
without governmental interference. It may be reasonable to believe that Justice
Frankfurter recognized the distinction between faculty academic freedom and
institutional autonomy, and that the latter category included "the four essential
freedoms of a university." Whatever Justice Frankfurter meant, because the
quotation from The Open Universities is found only in his concurrence, its
language could not constitute binding authority. 1 8
C. Justice Powell's Concurring Opinion in Bakke
As is well known, Board of Regents v. Bakke 19 concerned the complaint by a
student who had been denied admission to the University of California's Medical
School at Davis ("Medical School"), even though minority students with lower test
scores had been admitted. 20 Although the Justices wrote several separate opinions,
the Court divided evenly on two critical issues. Four Justices 21 found the Medical
School's special admissions program unlawful, while another four Justices 22 held
that the portions of the California Supreme Court's judgment enjoining the
Medical School from considering race as a factor for admission should be
24
reversed. 23 Justice Powell wrote separately.
Because Justice Powell was in the majority as the "swing vote" on both of these
issues, his separate opinion came to be characterized as the judgment of the Court,
in which the two sets of four other Justices respectively concurred on the two
issues just mentioned. 25 No Justices, however, concurred in certain other parts of
18. Even if Marks analysis were to be applied retroactively to Sweezy, it is clear that Justice
Frankfurter's quotation from The Open Universities could not be read as "the narrowest"
controlling rationale for the Court's decision. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds ... ') (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976)).
The Sweezy plurality made no mention of any "four essential freedoms of a university,"
but rather focused upon Sweezy's own academic freedom under the First Amendment. Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 250. Justice Frankfurter, himself, evidently was concerned about the state's intrusion
upon both faculty academic freedom and university autonomy; however, his concurrence uses
neither of these expressions. See id. at 261-62.
19. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. Id.at270-71.
21. Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. These Justices did
not reach the constitutional question, but instead held that the Medical School's admissions
program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 408-21.
22. Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79. These four Justices held that the Medical School's
"affirmative admission program" was an important state interest, which they deemed
constitutional under intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. They would have reversed the California
Supreme Court's judgment on all points. Id. at 324-26.
24. Id. at 269-324
25. See id. at 271-72 (where Justice Powell states that the two four-member sets of fellow
Justices concurred in his judgment). But see Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., id. at
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Justice Powell's opinion. For want of better terminology, it seems appropriate to
designate those parts where Justice Powell was writing only for himself as his
"concurring" opinion, although, arguably, "dissenting" opinion might be equally
apt. In this article, these parts will be referred to as Justice Powell's "concurring"
opinion or "concurrence." The portions of Justice Powell's concurrence pertinent
26
to the present topic are found in Parts IV-D and V-A of his opinion.
These portions of Justice Powell's concurring opinion include several
noteworthy misstatements and omissions. He began Part IV-D by stating that the
goal of attaining "a diverse student body" is "clearly ... a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. '27 As warrant for this
seemingly unproblematic proposition, Justice Powell explained: "Academic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. '28 Again, this statement,
taken by itself, seems straightforward. He continued: "The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body."' 29 In support of this understanding, Justice Powell then quoted from Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
30
study.
Justice Powell introduced this quotation by stating that the "four essential
freedoms" noted here "constitute academicfreedom. '31 It is unclear whether he
was under the mistaken impression that Justice Frankfurter had so described these
"four freedoms" or whether he intended this characterization as his own

326 ("Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of race in university admissions are permissible
and therefore, he joins with us to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it
prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future.") (emphasis
added).
26. Seeid. at311-18.
27. 1d. at 311-12. That such a goal would be constitutionally permissible does not appear
to have been in doubt. The critical issue in the case, rather, was what means might be
constitutionally employed to attain that goal.
28. Id. at 312. Justice Powell did not attribute the proposition that "[a]cademic freedom...
[is] a special concern of the First Amendment" to its source, namely, Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of University of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), where reference clearly is
to teachers' academic freedom, not to that of institutions.
29. Id. Justice Powell did not here distinguish between "a university" and its faculty.
30. Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). See supra text
accompanying notes 8, 17.
31. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Powell did not identify the source quoted by Justice
Frankfurter. See supra text accompanying notes 7-18. Justice Powell erroneously stated that
Justice Frankfurter had "summarized these four essential freedoms." Id. (emphasis added)
(quotation marks omitted). In fact, Justice Frankfurter had simply quoted from The Open
Universities in South Africa. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 17.
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contribution. He cited no authority for identifying "the four essential freedoms" of
a university as "academic freedom," nor did he attempt to explain how or why this
label might be appropriate. Justice Powell did not intimate that he thought he was
saying anything new at this point. It soon became clear, however, where his
analysis was going.
Immediately after this quotation from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, Justice
Powell made the following clearly erroneous statement: "Our national commitment
to the safeguarding of these freedoms within university communities was
emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents... ."32 In fact, Keyishian had said
nothing at all about these "four essential freedoms. '33 Justice Powell then
proceeded to quote language from Keyishian that clearly focused on the
importance of teachers' academic freedom and said nothing about any freedoms
enjoyed by universitiesunder the First Amendment or otherwise:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment.... The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
'34
authoritative selection.
Neither here nor elsewhere had the Keyishian Court even mentioned "who may be
admitted to study."
Next, Justice Powell stated, evidently as a matter of taking judicial notice: "[I]t
is widely believed" that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and
creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is... promoted by a

32. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))
(emphasis added). Keyishian quoted from the Sweezy plurality opinion, which referred to "[t]he
essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities." Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603
(quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250) (emphasis added). Neither the Sweezy plurality nor Keyishian
referred to the freedom of public colleges or universities. Both cases concerned the First
Amendment speech rights of individual faculty. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ.) ("Our university cases
have dealt with restrictions imposed from outside the academy on individual teachers' speech or
associations."). Justice Souter's concurrence cites not only Keyishian and Sweezy, but also
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (individual public school and college teachers' First
Amendment free speech and association rights), and Wieman v. Updegraff 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238 n.4. Other opinions that might be cited include Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Wieman, 344 U.S. at 194-96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (individual faculty
members' freedom of speech, inquiry, and association under the "Bill of Rights" and the
Fourteenth Amendment), and Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (teachers' and students'
academic freedom under the First Amendment).
33. Keyishian concerned a set of New York state laws and regulations that penalized
teachers in state colleges and universities for membership in "subversive" organizations or for
disfavored speech. See Hiers, supra note 7, at 41-43.
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). Possibly Justice Powell was thinking
that the Medical School's special admissions program had been devised by the faculty and was
administered jointly by its faculty and administration. See id. at 272 & n. 1, 278-79.
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diverse student body. '35 Having so stated, he then made the following misleading
statement: "As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. '36 The Keyishian
Court, in fact, had said nothing at all about exposure "to the ideas and mores of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples," however commendable such
exposure might be. In effect, Justice Powell put words into the Keyishian Court's
mouth. But that was not all.
Based on the interpolation just described, Justice Powell went on in his next
paragraph to conclude:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select
those students who will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of
ideas," petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of
the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must be viewed as
seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the
37
fulfillment of its mission.
The "robust exchange of ideas" language, as has been shown, derives from
Keyishian. In Keyishian, the issue had been the importance of teachers' freedom
to expose students to "that robust exchange of ideas." 38 Perhaps Justice Powell
intended to say that a university's selection of students who might be expected to
contribute to the "robust exchange of ideas" was an exercise of its academic
freedom which, in turn, was protected by the First Amendment. Thus Justice
Powell may have meant that by seeking to enroll diverse student bodies,
universities were attempting to bring about conditions under which academic
freedom could flourish. In that case, however, such universities would not have
been exercising their own First Amendment interest in academic freedom, but
instead, acting to bring about conditions where academic freedom could be
exercised by faculty and students on their campuses. It is also possible that Justice
Powell had in mind the fact that the Medical School's special admissions policy
had been established, and also in part administered by its faculty. 39 If so, he may
have meant to say that the Medical School (or the Regents) might properly invoke
the First Amendment on behalf of the faculty's academic freedom. It may be
35. Id. Justice Powell documented this contention by quoting from "the president of
Princeton University" as to "benefits derived from a diverse student body," but did not refer to
the trial court's findings of fact or cite to record evidence. Id. at 313 n.48.
36. Id. at 312-13. This language is quoted later by the Sixth Circuit in Grutter v. Bollinger,
288 F.3d 732, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), but apparently
without noticing that the phrase "to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples" did not derive from Keyishian, but rather was added by Justice Powell himself.
Others also evidently assumed that the phrase in question was found in Keyishian. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-15 and 238-39.
37. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
38. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Original plaintiffs in Keyishian
were university faculty (and a university librarian). Neither Keyishian nor Sweezy said anything
about college or university admission procedures or about the putative value of ethnically or
otherwise diverse student bodies.
39. Bakke, 438 U.S. at272-78, 272 n.l.
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significant that his opinion nowhere specifically states that the institution enjoyed a
First Amendment academic freedom interest of its own apart from its faculty. And
Justice Powell certainly never suggested that a university's "academic freedom"
40
and that of its faculty might be in mutual opposition.
Justice Powell's references to the First Amendment, here and elsewhere in his
concurring opinion, 41 are singularly cryptic, if not confused. He nowhere
explained how a university's interest in selecting students-an interest or
"freedom" he evidently derived from Justice Frankfurter's quotation from The
Open Universities-could have become a First Amendment right. Justice
Frankfurter had not so characterized it. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence, though joined by Justice Harlan, was still only a concurring opinion,
and as such had no binding authority. Keyishian, which Justice Powell cited as
authority, had nothing to say about student admissions programs or practices.
Justice Powell possibly meant that a public college or university's right to select
students on the basis of its own judgment, in short its exercise of autonomy in
matters requiring educational expertise, was an important social policy value and
thus an important state interest that could then be balanced against asserted equal
protection claims by students who had been denied admission on the basis of race.
He probably intended to provide a constitutional counterweight to Bakke's
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim by referring to a university
invoking a First Amendment interest. He did not, however, explain how the
Medical School could have both a First Amendment claim and at the same time
contend that it had a compelling state interest. 42 The Court had never held that
public colleges and universities themselves were entitled to First Amendment
protections. 43 Not surprisingly, Justice Powell did not attempt to explain how an
academic institution's admission procedure would constitute speech under the First
Amendment; 44 nor did he undertake to explain how or why a public college or
university should be considered a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
45
Amendment.

40. That theory later emerged in certain lower federal courts. See infra Part I.D.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49.
42. See Mark G. Yudoff, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 856
(1981) ("Had [Justice Powell] completely omitted reference to academic freedom in his [Bakke]
opinion and simply stated that the goal of student body diversity is a compelling state interest that
permits race to be taken into account in admissions decisions, he would have reached the same
result without muddying further [the notion of] institutional academic freedom.").
43. See infra Parts I.A., D.
44. The First Amendment reads, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (omitting
religion clauses). See infra Part ll.B.
45. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, reads, in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra Part II.C.
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Justice Powell added another problematic statement about the First Amendment
in Part V-A of his concurring opinion. 46 This statement only contributes further to
the confusion:
The experience of other university admissions programs, which take
race into account in achieving the educational diversity valued by the
First Amendment, demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number
of places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end.
47
An illuminating example is found in the Harvard College program.
Strangely, Justice Powell declared that educationaldiversity is "valued by the First
Amendment." How that might be the case, he did not say. 48 It is uncertain
whether, in the final analysis, Justice Powell meant to say that a public college or
university has a First Amendment academic freedom interest in selecting students
on the basis of sound educational judgment, or to say that "educational diversity"
itself-whatever that might mean-is per se a First Amendment interest or value.
Nor did Justice Powell explain how the admissions program at Harvard College, a
non-public institution, might exemplify the achievement of a First Amendment
value. 49 It could hardly be said that Harvard had a FirstAmendment right either to
Nor could Harvard's
select students or to achieve educational diversity.
admissions program, however exemplary, constitute a state interest of any sort.
Justice Powell very likely intended to use the Harvard plan as an example of the
kind of admissions program that would pass constitutional muster if sponsored by a
50
public college or university.
It appears that Justice Powell wished to claim the benefit of a First Amendment
right on behalf of public universities so as to fortify his argument that race might
be a constitutionally permissible factor in admissions decisions. Because Bakke
invoked the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, Justice Powell may
have felt it necessary to counterpose another constitutional interest on the side of
educational diversity. As rationale, he first characterized "the four essential

46. No other Justices joined in this part of Justice Powell's opinion, either.
47. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1967). Justice Powell then
proceeded to quote from a description of the Harvard admissions plan found in the appendix to an
amici brief for Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford Universities and the University of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 316-17.
48. Such diversity might be viewed as a social or public policy value or interest of the sort
that could be considered an important, or possibly compelling state interest. But what it means to
say that such diversity is "valued by the First Amendment" is quite unclear. Perhaps Justice
Powell meant that student body diversity could enhance viewpoint diversity, thereby contributing
to "robust exchange of ideas," a First Amendment value the Keyishian Court had previously
identified in upholding individual faculty rights. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
49. See text of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, supra notes 39-40. The First
Amendment was "incorporated," that is, first construed as applying to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
50. In the excerpt quoted supra, text accompanying note 47, Justice Powell specifically
refers to the Harvard plan as an "example." See also Justice Brennan's Bakke concurrence,
referring to "aplan like the 'Harvard' plan," 438 U.S. at 326 n.1. (emphasis added). Compare
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325
(2003), which discusses the Harvard plan as if it were, itself, subjected to judicial review.

542

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 30, No. 3

freedoms" as "academic freedom," then, in an attempt to extend such freedoms
constitutional support, invoked the authority of Keyishian, which had affirmed
51
teachers' academic freedom as a "special concern of the First Amendment,"
without even attempting to explain how Keyishian could apply to universities. It
may be significant that Justice Powell did not identify the academic freedom of
52
public colleges and universities as a compelling, or even important, state interest.
The only interest he characterized as "compelling" was "the interest of
'53
diversity... in the context of a university's admissions program.
In any event, Justice Powell's entire discussion of academic freedom and the
First Amendment is found only in his separate or "concurring" opinion, in parts
that were joined by no other Justice. 54 It would seem to follow that none of that
discussion carries any legal weight. This point might be underscored by the
observation of Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, in Bakke, itself:
Four [other] Members of the Court have undertaken to announce the
legal and constitutional effect of this Court's judgment .... It is hardly
necessary to state that only a majority can speak for the Court or
determine what is the "central meaning" of any judgment of the Court. 55
51. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Some lower federal courts have
followed Justice Powell's apparent view that Keyishian referred to institutions' academic
freedom. See, e.g., Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents, 739 F. Supp. 551, 552-53 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd,
945 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that in Keyishian the Court demonstrated its commitment
to protecting the academic freedoms of "state and local educational institutions"). Similar
language also appears in Paratev. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1989), invoking Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, and the Court's opinion in
Keyishian. This language appears to derive from dicta in Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 94-105.
52. It appears that even if Justice Powell had secured support from four other Justices for
his remarks about academic freedom and the First Amendment, such remarks would have been
mere dicta. The question of possible institutional academic freedom under the First Amendment
was not before the Bakke Court, nor did the Court need to decide that question in order to reach
its holdings in the case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 785-87 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Bobbs, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]t most, the question before the Court
in Bakke was whether race could ever be used in admissions decisions.") Id. at 787. Whether or
not Justice Powell's comments as to circumstances under which admissions policies might
properly consider race as a factor should be considered controlling under Marks analysis, it is
clear that determining whether race or ethnic diversity may be considered such a factor does not
depend on the institution's entitlement to First Amendment academic freedom. As to Marks
analysis, see infra text accompanying and following notes 56-60.
53. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1967). Not all interpreters
noticed this fact. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 216-17.
54. Justice Powell, himself, may not have recognized this fact. Writing for the Court in
1981, he referred to the portion of his Bakke opinion in which he had quoted from Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence as the "opinion of POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of
the Court." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981). The portion quoted and cited,
however, was from Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, Part IV-D of Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13,
which was joined by no other Justice.
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 n.1 (Justice Stevens, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and
Rehnquist, JJ.). See also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Justice Powell's
argument in [Part IV-D of his opinion in] Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case."). Justice Stevens' opinion
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Nevertheless, lower federal courts, confronting other cases involving public
college or university affirmative action or diversity admissions programs and
practices, and trying to decipher the legal significance of the several Bakke
opinions, have looked to Justice Powell's concurring opinion for guidance. In
doing so, several such courts have recently attempted to apply the Marks test,
namely: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of [at least] five Justices, 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
56
the judgment on the narrowest grounds.'
As the Court had occasion to notice in its reflections on Grutter, such efforts
have yielded mixed results.57 The difficulty of applying Marks to Bakke was
emphasized in Hopwood III, where a Fifth Circuit panel, expressing disagreement
with the Ninth Circuit's construction of Justice Powell's diversity rationale in
Bakke stated: "With respect, however, we do not read Marks as an invitation from
the Supreme Court to read its fragmented opinions like tea leaves, attempting to
divine what the Justices 'would have' held." 58 It certainly could be argued-as the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits later concluded-that under Marks, Justice Powell's view
59
that student body diversity can be a compelling state interest is controlling.
Yet when Marks is applied to Justice Powell's comments on academic freedom
and/or the First Amendment, it is quite apparent that these comments do not
constitute "that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds." None of the other eight Justices in Bakke even
mentioned academic freedom; nor did any of the other eight refer to any First
Amendment claims, rights, or interests on the part of the Regents, the Medical
School, or its faculty. Both Justice Powell and four other Justices 6° indicated their
approval of the Harvard admissions program. Because Harvard was (and is) a
private institution, however, its program needed, and had, no First Amendment
justification.
Notwithstanding, several lower court decisions subsequently
proceeded as if Bakke somehow had stood for the proposition that public colleges
and universities themselves were entitled to academic freedom rights or privileges
under the First Amendment. Significantly, none of these courts attempted to apply
Marks analysis to Justice Powell's comments about academic freedom and the
made no mention of Marks which had been decided the previous year. See infra text
accompanying notes 56-60.
56. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n. 15 (1976)).
, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2327 (2003).
57. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
58. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (opinion by Wiener, J.). For
contrasting results of applying Marks analysis to Bakke, see, for example, Grutter v. Bollinger,
288 F.3d 732, 739-42, 773, 778-85 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting), aft'd, 539 U.S. 306,
123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003); and Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d
1234, 1247 (11 th Cir. 2001).
59. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739-42; Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 11991201 (9th Cir. 2000).
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18, 321-25 (Powell, J., concurring); 438 U.S. at 326 n.1
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ.).
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First Amendment. Perhaps they were unaware that none of the other Justices in
Bakke had subscribed to those comments. Or, possibly, these courts assumed
without further reflection that a public university's compelling interest in student
body diversity somehow depended on its First Amendment interest in academic
freedom or institutional autonomy, and that because Justice Powell had said so,
61
public universities might invoke such interests.
62
D. Judicial Misconceptions Spawn Strange Progeny

In Bakke, Justice Powell had declared, ipse dixit, that public universities have a
63
First Amendment interest in their procedures for selecting students for admission.
The issue before the Bakke Court, of course, pertained only to student admissions
procedures. Ignoring this limitation, various lower federal courts began to assert
that public colleges and universities enjoy a broader range of First Amendment
rights or interests in academic freedom. In an even greater departure from
precedent, these lower courts announced that such academic freedom could be set
over against academic freedom claims by individual faculty. In doing so, such
courts generally relied either explicitly or implicitly on Justice Powell's quotation
of Justice Frankfurter's quotation in Sweezy from The Open Universities. That
quotation referred not only to student admissions procedures, but also to a
university's determination "on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, [and] how it shall be taught," 64 and so may have seemed relevant to these
other issues as well. Lower federal courts reciting and so construing this quotation
generally seemed unaware that it was enshrined only in concurring opinions, and
thus had no binding precedential weight.
1. Cooper v. Ross: Academic freedom vs. academic freedom
The first federal court to attribute academic freedom to a public educational
institution-albeit in dicta-was Cooper v. Ross,65 decided in 1979, a year after
Bakke. Grant Cooper, an untenured assistant professor of history at a public

61. By way of contrast, neither the Smith nor the Grutter court held that its respective
state's or public university's compelling interest in student diversity hinged on the university's
entitlement to academic freedom or the First Amendment. Neither court's analysis even
mentioned institutional academic freedom or the First Amendment. See Smith, 233 F.3d at 11971201; Grutter,288 F.3d at 738-42.
62. See generally Hiers, supra note 7, at 64-110.
63. See supra Part I.C.
Justice Powell had also stated, without explanation, that
"educational diversity" itself was a First Amendment value. See supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text. This value might be characterized as the desired goal (or result) of the
admissions process, but it is unclear how educational diversity per se might be conceptualized as
a First Amendment value.
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. See also CENTLIVRES, supra notes 8, 17, 30 and accompanying
text. As previously observed, The Open Universities did not distinguish between a university and
its faculty in their role as decision-makers with respect to the "four essential freedoms of a
university." See supraPart I.A., and Hiers, supra note 7, at 52-55.
65. 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (opinion by Heany, J., Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals judge sitting by designation).
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university, announced in class that he was a communist and that he taught from a
67
Marxist viewpoint. 66 The university subsequently terminated his appointment.
The district court characterized the issue before it as follows: "The present case...
involves a fundamental tension between the academic freedom of the individual
teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration, and the academic
freedom of the university to be free of government, including judicial,
interference. '68
The district court cited neither the Sweezy nor Bakke
concurrences, but may well have based its assertion that "the university" had "the
academic freedom. .. to be free of government interference" upon Justice
Frankfurter's quotation from The Open Universities concerning the "four essential
freedoms of a university," as quoted in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
69
Bakke, and there identified as constituting "academic freedom.
The district court's declaration that the "academic freedom of the university"
included freedom from "judicial interference" was unsupported by any authority or
rationale, and probably should be read as merely exuberant hyperbole. Possibly
the court was thinking of the social policy value of institutional autonomy, in
Cooper-as in Justice Powell's Bakke concurrence-mischaracterized as
"academic freedom." 70 The Cooper court may have thought, but did not
specifically state, that institutional academic freedom was a First Amendment
interest.
2. Justice Stevens' Concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent
Two years later, concurring in Widmar v. Vincent,7 1 Justice Stevens made
passing reference to "the academic freedom of public universities," 72 citing Justice
Frankfurter's quotation from The Open Universities as authority for the proposition
that "[j]udgments [as to use of resources] should be made by academicians, not by

66. Id. at 804-05.
67. Id. at 805.
68. Id. at 813. This language is dicta since the court did not reach the issue. Oddly, Cooper
has been read as illustrating the mistaken idea that the Court has "[g]enerally ... described ...
constitutional academic freedom.., as primarily an institutional liberty." Ailsa W. Chang, Note,
Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search For a Standard
Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 931 n.79 (2001). Cooper, of course, was

not decided by the Court, and the Court has never held that academic freedom is an institutional
liberty.
69. See supratext accompanying notes 30-31.
70. No federal court has ever gone so far as to hold that public institutions of higher
education are immune from judicial review. But see dicta in Weinstein, infra text accompanying
note 107. The Court recently stated the issues clearly: "Our holding ... is in keeping with our
tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions within
constitutionally prescribed limits." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, _,
123 S. Ct. 2325,
2339 (2003). See infra text accompanying note 233 for a recent and accurate account of the
situation by the Court in Grutter.
71. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
72. "In my opinion, the use of the terms 'compelling state interest' and 'public forum' to
analyze the question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of
public universities." Id. at 277-78 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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federal judges. '73 Justice Stevens did not indicate that he thought public
universities' academic freedom was based on the First Amendment. Neither did he
distinguish between public universities and their faculties. His reference to
"academicians" might more plausibly be read to mean the latter.
The issue in Widmar was whether the university in question might
constitutionally exclude a student religious group from using a forum open to other
student groups. 74 Again, it would have been more apt to characterize the
university's interest in terms of the importance of academic autonomy, rather than
as a matter of its "academic freedom." Although Justice Stevens' concurrence in
Widmar necessarily was not binding authority, it may have influenced subsequent
Seventh Circuit reflections. Justice Stevens had previously served on the Seventh
Circuit, and was (and still is) the Supreme Court's mentor or liaison "allotted" to
that Circuit.
3. Seventh Circuit Dicta and Doctrine: Public Colleges and Universities
Have Academic Freedom, Too
The Seventh Circuit first mentioned institutional academic freedom, though
only in dicta and as a hypothetical, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen 75 decided the
year following Widmar. Salient language is as follows: "Case law considering the
standard to be applied where the issue is academic freedom of the university to be
free of governmental interference, as opposed to academic freedom of the
individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration, is
surprisingly sparse."'76 This language appears to derive from Cooper, but aside

73. Id. at 278-79. Justice Stevens misattributed the Frankfurter Sweezy concurrence
quotation to T. H. Huxley, to whose views, along with those of other educators, Justice
Frankfurter had alluded before proceeding to quote from The Open Universities. Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also cited
to Justice Powell's mention of academic freedom in his concurring Bakke opinion. Widmar, 454
U.S. at 278 n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring). Compare Justice Stevens' statement in Bakke "that only
a majority can speak for the Court." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408
(1967). See supra text accompanying note 55.
74. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. Although
Justice Powell likewise quoted from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy and cited his
own opinion in Bakke, he did not here characterize the university's interest or right in this case as
a matter of "academic freedom." Instead, he cited these authorities to support the following
statement: "Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources or 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' Id.at 276.
75. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 1275. Here "as opposed to" evidently meant "as distinct from" rather than "in
opposition to." The court went on in the next sentence to say: "But what precedent there is at the
Supreme Court level suggests that to prevail over academic freedom the interests of government
must be strong and the extent of intrusion carefully limited." Id. In context, the court's language
as to "the interests of government" evidently refers to the interests of university administration.
The Dow court's statement quoted here, in its context, would have been an accurate description of
competing interests ifit had referred to the "academic autonomy" of a university rather than its
"academic freedom," thus faculty academic freedom as distinct from the government's interest in
university autonomy.
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from dicta in Cooper, there were no cases on point, and thus there was no case law
whatsoever purporting to accord colleges or universities any kind of "academic
freedom to be free of governmental interference."'77 The Dow court did not
characterize the university's interest in academic freedom as a First Amendment
value. Seventh Circuit dicta, hypotheticals, and concurrences would soon blossom
into case law purporting to establish institutional academic freedom as a
counterweight to faculty academic freedom. In these decisions, both implicitly and
explicitly, the Seventh Circuit conceived such institutional academic freedom as a
First Amendment right or interest that could be claimed by or on behalf of public
colleges and universities themselves.
The first such Seventh Circuit decision was E.E.O.C. v. University of Notre
Dame Du Lac,78 where the court recognized what it called "a qualified academic
freedom privilege" which, in certain circumstances, would protect "academic
institutions against the disclosure of the names and identities of persons
participating in the peer review process. . . ."79 The court held that this privilege
barred further investigation by the E.E.O.C. As authority, it quoted "'the four
essential freedoms' that constitute academic freedom" language from Justice
Powell's "plurality opinion" in Bakke, along with Justice Powell's quotation of
"the business of a university" language from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence. 80 The Notre Dame Du Lac court implied that its newly created
"academic freedcm privilege" was somehow based on the First Amendment,81 but
did not explain how. In this case, the privilege-however characterized-served
to protect the confidentiality of faculty discussions, and had nothing to do with
institutional interests vs. faculty academic freedom. In 1990, the Supreme Court
intimated that it would not recognize institutional claims to such privilege in
77. The concept of such freedom surfaced again the next year in a Seventh Circuit
concurring opinion, Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J. concurring).
Judge Coffey cited and evidently based his ideas as to a university's academic freedom on Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Bakke and its quotation from Justice Frankfurter's quotation in
Sweezy from The Open Universities. Martin, 699 F.2d at 397 (Coffey, J., concurring).
78. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., writing for the panel).
79. Id. at 337. The court cited other decisions which, it said, had previously recognized "a
limited academic freedom privilege in the context of challenges to college or university tenure
decisions." Id. Though some of the decisions cited referred to a "limited academic privilege,"
none of them adopted the expression "academic freedom privilege." See Hiers, supra note 7, at
74 n.223.
80. Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 335. Judge Coffey also quoted from his own
concurring opinion in Martin, 699 F.2d at 397. See supra note 77.
81. The Notre Dame Du Lac court quoted Justice Powell's Bakke concurrence which
seemed to characterize "the freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education"
as an "[a]cademic freedom" right "long viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."
Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 335 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
312 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Notre Dame Du Lac court also cited Garlandv. Torre,
259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1958) (plaintiffs defamation and breach of contract claims
outweighed defendant's freedom of the press interest, given that First Amendment rights are not
absolute) for the proposition "that the protection of [such interests as] the [University's] First
Amendment [academic freedom privilege] 'is not absolute' and must give way in some cases 'to
the paramount public interests in the fair administration ofjustice."' Id.at 337. The relevance of
Garlandas to this issue is not immediately apparent.
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University of Pennsylvaniav. E.E. 0. C.82 In University of Pennsylvania,the Court
unanimously declined to accept what it characterized as the University's claim to
an "expanded right of academic freedom to protect confidential peer review
materials from disclosure, ' 83 stating: "[W]e think the First Amendment cannot be
extended to embrace petitioner's claim. ' 84 In view of this holding, it would seem
that Notre Dame Du Lac was no longer good law after 1990.85
Two years after Notre Dame Du Lac, in Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College District 415,86 another Seventh Circuit panel asserted, again in dicta, that
public institutions of higher learning are entitled to academic freedom, and that
87
such academic freedom could conflict with individual faculty academic freedom.
Albert Piarowski was chairman of the art department at Prairie State College in
Illinois. 88 He chose to display in the college mall, its main gathering place and
thoroughfare, three of his own works featuring naked or semi-naked "brown"
women apparently carrying out various sexual acts. 89 College officials asked him
to move the three items to a less central location which was adjacent to the art
department's classrooms. 90 Piarowski contended that the officials had thereby
violated his First Amendment rights. 91
Judge Posner wrote for the panel. Because his dicta would soon morph into
Seventh Circuit case law, the relevant language is quoted at some length:
[T]hough many decisions describe "academic freedom" as an aspect of
freedom of speech that is protected against government abridgment by
the First Amendment, the term is equivocal. It is used to denote both
the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from
the government (the sense in which it is used, for example, in Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, or
in our recent decision in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac),
and the freedom of the individual teacher.., to pursue his ends without

82. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
83. Id. at 183
84. Id.at 199.
85. Since 1996, any newly created privilege probably would also be subject to scrutiny
under standards laid out in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). The Jaffee Court noted that
"Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by
interpreting 'common law principles ...in the light of reason and experience,"' id.at 8, adding,
however, that "[e]xceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privilege may be
justified.., by a 'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth."' Id.at 9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 (1980)). At the same time, the Court explicitly rejected the balancing approach on the ground
that "the participants in the confidential conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected."' Id.at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981)).
86. 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985).
87. See id.at 629.
88. Id. at 626.
89. Id.at 627.
90. Id. at 628.
91. Id.at 627.

2004]

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict,
92
as in this case.
What is of interest here is Judge Posner's characterization of the term "academic
freedom" as "equivocal." Although he refers to 'academic freedom' as an aspect
of freedom of speech that is protected against government abridgment by the First
Amendment," he did not explicitly ground "the freedom of the academy" on the
First Amendment. 93 Quite possibly Judge Posner realized that neither Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion nor the Notre Dame Du Lac court had adequately
connected academic freedom to the First Amendment. If so, by referring to "the
freedom of the academy," he may have meant to designate the social policy value
or importance of institutional autonomy. By characterizing such autonomy as
"academic freedom," however, Judge Posner framed a false paradox: as if the issue
were academic freedom versus academic freedom. Where college or university
administrators are alleged to have violated a faculty member's academic freedom,
the issue would be framed more aptly as faculty academic freedom versus
institutional autonomy.
4. Back to the Supreme Court: Regents v. Ewing
Justice Stevens characterized this kind of issue almost correctly in footnote
dicta in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing. 94 Scott Ewing, a student
in the University's six-year undergraduate and medical school program, failed five
of seven subjects on an examination where passing was requisite to continued

92. Id. at 629 (internal citations omitted). This language has misled a few courts in other
federal appellate jurisdictions into supposing that institutions are endowed with academic
freedom and that such academic freedom could conflict with the academic freedom of individual
faculty. See, e.g., Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989); Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents,
739 F. Supp. 551, 552-53 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1991).
That Judge Posner's description of faculty academic freedom as the right "to pursue his
ends without interference from the academy" could be considered overbroad is here merely
mentioned. To the extent that faculty academic freedom is treated as a First Amendment right, it
would appear that such freedom necessarily extends only to some reasonably identifiable mode of
speech or expression. See infra Part lI.B.
93. Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629. Judge Posner failed to mention that no other Justices had
joined the portion of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion that referred to academic freedom, and that
such references had at most only persuasive authority. As noted supra text accompanying note
80, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Notre Dame Du Lac likewise was based only on concurring
opinions, those of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy and Justice Powell in Bakke. In Notre Dame Du
Lac, moreover, there was no conflict between purported faculty academic freedom and that of the
institution. In a later case, Judge Posner cited Piarowski in support of the proposition "that one
dimension of academic freedom is the right of academic institutions to operate free of heavyhanded governmental, including judicial, interference." Osteen v. Henly, 13 F.3d 221, 225-26
(7th Cir. 1993) (opinion by Posner, C.J.) (student challenged university official's disciplinary
action). Here, again, Chief Judge Posner did not specifically base the idea of institutional
academic freedom on the First Amendment, but seems to have treated it instead as an important
public policy value or state interest. He did not elaborate upon his suggestion that academic
institutions should be exempt from judicial review.
94. 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (upholding medical school faculty's dismissal of medical student
who claimed due process violation).
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registration in that program. 95 A faculty committee reviewed Ewing's academic
96
record and unanimously voted not to permit him to retake the examination.
Ewing sued, claiming breach of contract and violation of his "substantive due
process rights. '97 The Court upheld the University's refusal to allow Ewing to
retake the examination. 98 Academic freedom was not an issue in the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens took the occasion to reflect on academic freedom and
institutional autonomy in the following dictum: "Academic freedom thrives not
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making
by the academy itself."99 Possibly Justice Stevens had been misled by Judge
Posner's characterization of academic freedom as "equivocal" into imagining some
inconsistency. Faculty academic freedom and institutional autonomy may indeed
conflict, but the meaning of "academic freedom" is "equivocal" or inconsistent
only if institutional autonomy is mistakenly (and arbitrarily) labeled "academic
freedom."
It is sometimes said that the Supreme Court adopted the concept of institutional
academic freedom in Ewing.100 In the text to which the footnote quoted above is
appended, the Court stated: "Added to our concern for lack of standards, is a
reluctance to trench upon the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, 'a special
concern of the First Amendment. "' 10 1 The Keyishian language quoted by the
Court referred specifically to individual teacher's academic freedom, not to that of
public colleges and universities. 10 2 Justice Stevens evidently was thinking of
"state and local educational institutions" as places where courts "should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment," and should "override" such
judgment only if it "is such a substantial departure from academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment."' 103 It seems likely that Justice Stevens was thinking of the
importance of either the faculty's academic freedom or institutional autonomy, and
did not intend, whether casually or surreptitiously, to canonize institutional
academic freedom-or autonomy-as a First Amendment right. He may have
meant that a university might invoke the First Amendment on behalf of its
95,

Id. at 215-16.

96. Id. at 216.
97. Id. at215-17.
98. Id. at 227-28.
99. Id. at 226 n.12, (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) and
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) as authority for the former proposition, and
Justice Powell's Bakke and Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrences as authority for the latter).
100. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm in Support
of Respondents at 9, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
101. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603,
(1967)).
102.

See supra notes 15,32.

103. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225. It is clear on the facts in Ewing and in this statement that by
"state and local educational institutions" Justice Stevens was referring to the faculty's exercise of
professional judgment.
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faculty's policy or decision-making.10 4
In any case, the Court's language about safeguarding institutions' academic
freedom is dicta. The question of institutional academic freedom was not before
the Court nor was institutional academic freedom part of the Court's holding in
Ewing. Instead, the Ewing Court held that the faculty's decision to dismiss the
student from Medical School was not unreasonable and therefore did not offend
105
due process.
5. More Seventh Circuit Decisions and Dicta
Nevertheless, on the basis of Judge Posner's language in Piarowski opposing
institutional academic freedom to that of individual faculty, subsequent Seventh
Circuit panels proceeded to declare in a series of cases that these freedoms are
mutually opposed. In most of these cases, the court's panels deferred, or would
have deferred, to purported institutional interests, finding that these outweighed or
trumped faculty members' rights or interests in First Amendment academic
freedom. 106
In some of these cases, the language noted is dicta; in others, it represents the
court's holdings or stated rationales. The following cases illustrate the Seventh
Circuit's endorsement of the idea of institutional academic freedom: Weinstein v.
University of Illinois,10 7 Shelton v. Trustees of Indiana University,108 Keen v.
Penson,10 9 Webb v. Board of Trustees of Ball State University,I 0 and Feldman v.

104. In that case, however, the faculty would have been acting as agents for the state. On
further reflection, Justice Stevens would very likely have recognized that the University could not
have invoked First Amendment protection on its behalf in that capacity. See infra Part II. Justice
Stevens had no occasion to reflect further on the matter in Ewing, since, in his view, that case did
not turn on the First Amendment, but rather, on due process. See Justice Souter's concurrence in
Southworth, infra note 105, joined by Justice Stevens.
105. Id. at 227-28. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) ("Ewing
addressed not the relationship between academic freedom and First Amendment burdens imposed
by a university, but a due process challenge to a university's academic decisions.") Id. at 236
(Souter, J. concurring, joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ.).
106. See infra notes 107-15.
107. 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). In dicta the Weinstein court stated: "Weinstein invokes
'academic freedom,' but that equivocal term .. does not help him. Judicial interference with a
university's selection and retention of its faculty would be an interference with academic
freedom." Id. at 1097 n.4. Here again is an expression of the peculiar idea that purported
institutional academic freedom is or should be immune from judicial review. See supra note 85
and text accompanying notes 60-63. Perhaps the court meant only to say that judges should defer
to institutional autonomy on matters of academic policy made by professional educators, absent
alleged violation of constitutional or statutory rights. Its use of inappropriate conceptual
categories, however, necessarily resulted in confusion. See infra Part I1.E.
108. 891 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., writing for the panel). See also a Sixth
Circuit case decided the same year, Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989):
"[Blecause the university must remain independent and autonomous to enjoy academic freedom,
the federal courts are reluctant to interfere in the internal operations of the academy."
109. 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992). Penson was the university's chancellor.
110. 167 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 1999). "Justices Frankfurter and Harlan referred to the four
freedoms of a university: 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
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Ho. 11'
All of these opinions cited Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy, Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Bakke, or cases deriving from either, as binding
authority. None of these Seventh Circuit opinions undertook to apply Marks to
Justice Powell's concurrence.' 1 2 Neither Weinstein, Shelton, Keen, or Webb
specifically stated that universities' academic freedom was rooted in the First
Amendment. The Feldman court did so, but with reference to "academic
3
independence," not academic freedom. 1
Writing for the panel in Feldman, Judge Easterbrook cited Justice Frankfurter's
Sweezy concurrence, this time as authority for reversing a jury award to an
assistant professor of mathematics whose employment at Southern Illinois
University had been terminated after accusing the department chairman of
professional misconduct. 1 4 Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Given the verdict, we must assume that Ho reacted adversely to
Feldman's accusation against his colleague and that this led the
University to end Feldman's employment.... But it does not follow
that a jury rather than the faculty determines whether Feldman's
accusation was correct. A university's academic independence is
protected by the Constitution, just like a faculty member's own speech.
Concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan referred to the four freedoms of a university: "to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
15
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."''
Evidently Judge Easterbrook and his Feldman panel colleagues believed that
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy had somehow endowed public
universities (or their administrations) with some kind of constitutional support for
their exercise of "academic independence."
While the Seventh Circuit read prior case law to say that public colleges and
universities are entitled to academic freedom under the First Amendment, and that
such institutional academic freedom can outweigh, that is, be deemed more
important than, faculty academic freedom, the Fourth Circuit was prepared to go
considerably further in its deference to institutional authority.
6. The Fourth Circuit's Reconstruction of Federal Academic Freedom
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis
added). Compare Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents, 739 F. Supp. 551, 553 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 945
F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Sweezy as authority for the "four essential freedoms" of a
university, likewise without apparently being aware that this language was not that of the Court,
but only that of Justice Frankfurter, concurring).
111. 171 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1999). The other named appellee was the Board of Trustees of
Southern Illinois University.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.

113.

Feldman, 171F.3d at 495.

114. Id. Subsequently, Feldman charged Ho, the department chairman, and other university
officials, with violating his First Amendment speech rights. Id.
115. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Jurisprudence: Public Institutions Have It; Individual Faculty Do
Not
The Fourth Circuit's novel perspective on First Amendment academic freedom
evolved only recently. This court's position, set out in a pair of en banc opinions,
is that public educational institutions alone are entitled to invoke the protection of
academic freedom under the First Amendment; moreover, individual faculty are
not, and never have been so entitled. The court's articulation of this new doctrine
in these cases can be considered without detailing the respective fact situations. 116
117
The earlier of these cases, Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education
concerned a high school drama teacher, Margaret Boring, who had selected a
somewhat unconventional play for her students to perform."18 Later, the school
principal arranged for Boring's involuntary transfer to another school.,1 9 Her
complaint charged that the transfer was "in retaliation for expression of unpopular
views through the production of the play and thus in violation of her right to
freedom of speech." 120 The en banc court held that Boring had "no First
Amendment right to insist on the makeup of the curriculum."' 121 As rationale, the
courted quoted, inter alia, from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy:
Justice Frankfurter, in concurrence, related the four essential freedoms
of a university, which should no less obtain in public schools unless
quite impractical or contrary to law:
It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential
freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.
We agree with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the
22
school, not the teacher, has the right to fix the curriculum.
The court did not mention that Justice Frankfurter, like the authors of The Open
Universities, was concerned about external governmental intrusion, not allocation
of authority within an academic institution. Justice Frankfurter had not said that
institutions (or institutional administrators) might determine curricula but that
116. For description of the fact situations and further analysis of the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in these cases, see Hiers, supra note 7, at 88-104.
117. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
118. Id. at 366.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 367.
121. Id. at 370. It is not at all clear that Boring had so insisted. She had consulted the
school's principal in advance and, pursuant to his request which had been prompted by a parent's
complaint about the play's first performance, modified the script for subsequent performances.
See id. at 374-75 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id at 375-77 (Motz, J., dissenting). For present
purposes, however, the facts need not be considered.
122. Id. at 370 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263). Neither Plato nor Burke, of course, was
an authority in the field of U.S. Constitutional law. Nor had either stated in the excerpts quoted
by the court that schools, rather than teachers, had "the right to fix the curriculum."

554

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 30, No. 3

teachers might not do so. Boring had not contended that her academic freedom
was implicated by her transfer; nor did the Boring court address academic freedom
in the course of its analysis. 123 Nevertheless, the en banc court soon applied its
holdings in Boring to the question of academic freedom in public colleges and
universities.
It did so in Urofsky v. Gilmore,124 decided in 2000. The issue in Urofsky was
whether a state (or more precisely, Commonwealth) law restricting
Commonwealth employees' access to sexually explicit materials on computers
owned or leased by the Commonwealth infringed those employees' First
Amendment academic freedom rights. 125 Plaintiffs in the case were six professors
employed at Virginia public colleges and universities. 126 The district court found
in plaintiffs' favor, 127 but its decision was reversed first by a panel, 128 and again by
the en banc court.

123.

129

The majority did quote from Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District, 890

F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989): "Although the concept of academic freedom has been recognized
in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of public school
curricula." In Boring, the Fourth Circuit was not discussing academic freedom as such, but rather
was determining, in the negative, whether Boring's selection of the play in question was "a matter
of public concern" and thus possibly eligible for protection under the First Amendment. Under
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), as subsequently construed, for a public employee's
speech to be accorded First Amendment protection, the court must first decide, as a matter of law,
that the speech addressed or related to "a matter of public concern."
As to the problems of applying the Connick line of cases to academic freedom claims, see Chris
Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public University Professor,27 J.C. & U.L. 669

(2001); Chang, supra note 68, at 915; Damon L. Krieger, Comment, May Public Universities
Restrict Faculty from Receiving or Transmitting Information Via University Computer
Resources? Academic Freedom, the First Amendment, and The Internet, 59 MD. L. REV. 1398
(2000); and Richard Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say, Does
That Star-SpangledFirstAmendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1993).

124. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). This en banc decision reflected considerable
disagreement. In addition to the seven-member majority, there were three concurring opinions,
and a dissenting opinion joined by three other judges. Id.at 404.
125.

Id.

126. Id.
127. Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.Va. 1988).
128. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999).
129. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 416 (4th Cir. 2000). The Urofsky decision generated
considerable interest and mixed reviews among commentators. See, e.g., Stacy E. Smith, Who
Owns Academic Freedom?: The Standardfor Academic Free Speech at Public Universities, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299 (2002); Kate Williams, Loss of Academic Freedom on the Internet:
The Fourth Circuit's Decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 REV. OF LITIG. 293 (2002); Doug
Rendleman, Academic Freedom in Urofsky 's Wake: Post September 11 Remarks on "Who Owns
Academic Freedom?", 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361 (2002); Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts on
Academic Freedom: Urofsky and Beyond, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 257 (2001); ConstitutionalLaw FirstAmendment - Academic Freedom - Fourth Circuit Upholds Virginia Statute Prohibiting
State Employees from Downloading Sexually Explicit Material. - Urofsky v. Gilmore, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1414 (2001); Rabban, Academic Freedom, supra note 6, at 18-20; and Krieger,
supra note 123. Evaluations range between good result though specious reasoning, and

"aberrant," "pernicious," "atriumph for collectivism and conformity." 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
at 361-62.
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The en banc court characterized the professors' claims as follows: "[The
professors] first maintain that the Act is unconstitutional as to all state employees;
failing this, they argue more particularly that the Act violates academic employees'
right to academic freedom." 130 The court initially decided that the statute in
question did not violate the rights of Commonwealth employees generally,
inasmuch as it applied only to those employees when acting in their role as
employees:
The speech at issue-access to certain materials using computers owned
or leased by the state for the purpose of carrying out employment
duties-is clearly made in the employee's role as employee. Therefore,
the challenged aspect of the Act does not regulate the speech of the
citizenry in general, but rather the speech of state employees in their
13
capacity as employees. 1
Turning to the six Virginia professors' First Amendment academic freedom
claim, the en banc court declared:
Our review of the law ...

leads us to conclude that to the extent the

Constitution recognizes any right of "academic freedom" above and
beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled,
the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors, and is
t 32
not violated by terms of the Act.
To justify this remarkable conclusion, the court then revisited a series of
Supreme Court decisions, reading the decisions to say that the Constitution

130. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 406.
131. Id at 408-09. Earlier, in Boring the en banc Fourth Circuit had implied that the "role"
in which public employees "speak" is virtually dispositive as to any First Amendment challenges
they might raise. The court read Connick to mean that public employee speech could be protected
under the First Amendment only if it related to a "matter of public concern," and that if any
employee spoke in the role of employee, her speech would fail that threshold test. Boring v.
Buncombe County Boardof Education, 136 F.3d 364, 367-70 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See also

id. at 375, 379 (Motz, J., dissenting) ("Conceivably, the majority's holding is grounded in
misreading Connick to make the role in which a public employee speaks determinative of whether
her speech merits First Amendment protection.") The en banc Urofsky court explicitly adopted
this restrictive test: "Thus, critical to a determination of whether employee speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection is whether the speech is 'made primarily in the [employee's] role as
citizen or primarily in his role as employee."' Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407 (quoting Terrell v. Univ.
of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986)). See also id.at 407-09. Compare
Cockrel v. Shelby County School District, 270 F.3d 1036, 1050-52 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 813 (2002), criticizing the Fourth Circuit's decision in Boring, and stating: "[T]he key
question is not whether a person is speaking in his role as an employee or a citizen, but whether
the employee's speech in fact touches on matters of public concern." Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052.
132. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410. Perhaps so as to leave no doubt as to its position, the court
then added: "Appellees ask us to recognize a First Amendment right of academic freedom that
belongs to the professor as an individual. The Supreme Court, to the extent it has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an
institutional right of self-govemance in academic affairs." Id.at 412. Compare Berg v. Bruce,
112 F.3d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Academic Freedom is designed to 'protect the individual
professor's classroom method from the arbitrary interference of university officials."') (quoting
Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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protected institutional academic freedom but not that of individual faculty. 13 3 Not
surprisingly, perhaps, the court drew substantially upon Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Sweezy 134 and Justice Powell's concurrence in Bakke. 135 The
Urofsky court did not actually hold that in this case the colleges and universities
where appellees were employed were protected, somehow, by academic freedom.
Rather, its point seems to have been that these faculty members themselves were
not so protected. Arguably, therefore, its contention that academic institutions are
entitled to academic freedom under the Constitution should be read as dicta.
Possibly for that reason the Fourth Circuit did not feel obligated to explain how
public colleges or universities, themselves government agencies, might be
understood to enjoy a First Amendment academic freedom interest or any other
First Amendment right. Nevertheless, in view of its endorsement by a clear
majority of the en banc court, 136 it would not be surprising if, following Urofsky,
Fourth Circuit panels and federal district courts within the Fourth Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction adjudicating academic freedom claims were to consider
themselves bound by this dicta.
II. INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A "CONSTITUTIONAL" CONCEPT WITH NO
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION

As has been shown, a few Justices, either in concurring opinions or in dicta,
have proposed that public colleges and universities are endowed with a
constitutionally protected interest in academic freedom. No Supreme Court
decision, however, has so held. Nevertheless, as has been shown, two federal
appellate courts have announced, whether in dicta or decisional law, that pubic
institutions are indeed so endowed. Significantly, no Justice or lower federal court
has ventured to establish any constitutional theory connecting the concept of
institutional academic freedom with the First Amendment-or with any other
constitutional basis. Few, it seems, have considered such theorizing necessary.
Instead, judicial proponents of the concept apparently have assumed that the
language quoted by Justice Frankfurter in his Sweezy concurrence from The Open
Universities about the "four essential freedoms of a university," subsequently
designated "academic freedom" by Justice Powell in his Bakke concurrence,
somehow granted this concept constitutional status. Perhaps no explanation has
been forthcoming because there may be none.

133. The court's analysis of these opinions is described and critiqued by the present writer,
supra note 7, at 97-104, and need not be discussed further here. It may be mentioned, however,
that the Supreme Court itself had recently identified "danger ... to speech from the chilling of
individual thought and expression" as concerns addressed in both Sweezy and Keyishian.
Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995) (emphasis
added). See also Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) ("Our university cases have
dealt with restrictions imposed from outside the academy on individual teachers' speech or
associations."). Id. at 238 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
134. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412-13, 414.
135. Id. at 414.
136. But see id. at 426, 434-35 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance of
academic free speech and not endorsing the concept of institutional academic freedom).
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There are three major constitutional obstacles that an explanation would have to
overcome. Each obstacle alone would seriously undermine the notion that the
Constitution somehow undergirds the purported academic freedom of public
colleges and universities. In the first place, it is well established that the First
Amendment protects the rights of persons against governmental interference; it
does not and could not protect government from First Amendment claims asserted
by persons. Additionally, in its terms, the First Amendment protects speech or
expression, but not the process or act of decision-making. By virtue of its
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, moreover, the First Amendment
can be said to protect only persons, a category that, in U.S. jurisprudence to date,
has not been held to include public institutions of higher learning. On those
occasions when the Court has considered governmental speech, its analysis has
never accorded such speech First Amendment protection. It is further suggested
that much of the confusion evident in judicial references to institutional First
Amendment interests derives from failure to distinguish carefully between and
among important conceptual categories.
A. Under the Constitution the Government has Power; Citizens have Rights.
Since the Magna Carta, it has been axiomatic that, while constitutions may
endow governments with power or authority, constitutions also set limits to such
power. Such is the case, obviously, with the U.S. Constitution. The Bill of Rights
necessarily limits the power of the federal government by specifying what the
government may not do, and thereby establishes various correlative constitutional
rights that citizens, or more broadly, "the people," may assert against the
government's exercise of its power. The First Amendment clearly illustrates this
familiar pattern. Omitting the Religion Clauses, it states: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
137
grievances."
These limits to the power of government and correlative rights of the people
were extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 138 which reads in
relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
39
protection of the laws. 1
Clearly these provisions limit the power of government. The government, whether
federal or state, may have interests, but under these provisions of the Constitution,
it does not have rights. A noted constitutional law scholar has written recently:
When I refer to "government," I refer to any institution or person

137.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

138.

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

139.
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possessing the authority to exercise coercive powers of government to
limit the autonomy or freedoms of an individual.
Hence, a dean, who possesses those powers in regard to the interests of
a faculty member, is government, even though the dean's powers were
delegated by a university (also government) and the university's powers
were delegated by the legislature (also government). To the extent that
a faculty collective possesses delegated power to make rules or
decisions that may be applied coercively (in the sense I have referred
to), the faculty is a government decision-maker and its decisions
constitute governmental action.
In short, in the context that interests us, government possesses power
and only power, and nothing else. Despite numerous judicial statements
to the contrary, government possesses no "rights," except in those
contexts in which its status and actions do not involve the exercise of
the coercive application of governmental power....
Governments possess the power to create academic institutions,
prescribe job qualifications for teachers, prescribe curricula, make
teaching assignments and the like....
By contrast vis a vis
government, individuals have no powers, but only rights. Individuals
have academic freedom to make teaching decisions within the ambit of
job assignments. Individuals also possess academic freedom (i.e., the
right) not to be penalized for exercising protected rights (usually
speech) both on and off the job. A sometimes important aspect of this
is the right not to be selected out for adverse treatment based upon the
content or viewpoint of one's point of view when those expressing other
viewpoints are not so penalized. The essence of this is that academic
freedom in the constitutional sense must find its moorings primarily in
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 140
Again, as stated succinctly by Judge Smith in Hopwood I: "The First
Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of government, not
government from its citizens."1 41 Public colleges and universities are government
agencies. Actions by officials, whether faculty or administrators, on behalf of the
institution, are actions of government.
Such actions may affect the First
Amendment or other constitutional rights of persons. It is, however, wellestablished law in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that these public
institutions themselves, as government agencies, do not have First Amendment

140. Memorandum from Professor Joseph W. Little, Levin College of Law of the University
of Florida, to Richard Hiers (June 18, 2003) (on file with author). The memorandum is quoted
with Professor Little's permission.
141. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996). See also supra note 1
and accompanying text. The present writer does not propose to endorse the Hopwood court's
contention that a law school's consideration of race or ethnicity for the purpose of achieving a
diverse student body can never be considered a compelling state interest. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at
944. However, that court's statement quoted in this article regarding the First Amendment
appears to be not only sound, but incontrovertible.
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rights.

B. The First Amendment Protects Speech, Not Institutional "Determinations"
or Actions
In its terms relevant to the present topic, the First Amendment protects
speech. 143 It is difficult to see how the language of the First Amendment could be
construed to protect institutional decision-making in any of the areas identified in
The Open Universities of South Africa as "the four essential freedoms of a
university": namely, determining "on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' 144 In public
colleges and universities, such decision-making, whether by faculty or
administration or both, is an exercise of governmental power. In the course of
making such decisions, faculty and administrators typically read various
documents, for example, curricula vitae, publications, course syllabi and
admissions applications, and discuss relevant matters with one another; but neither
making such determinations nor actions taken pursuant to them constitutes
speech.

145

If academic freedom is indeed a First Amendment concern-as the Supreme
Court has said it is,14 6 academic freedom can only be considered to be "within" or
protected by that Amendment to the extent that it involves speech or viewpoint
expression.' 47 Decision-making by persons acting for or as state government
142. See, e.g., Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638
(11th Cir. 1990) ("When the competing speaker is the government, that speaker is not itself
NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990)
protected by the first amendment .. ");
("[T]he First Amendment protects citizens' speech only from government regulations;
government speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment.") (citing Columbia Broad.
concurring);
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 481 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The LSO, a state entity,
itself has no First Amendment rights ....
");Estiveme v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 379
(5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he first amendment does not protect government speech .. ");Muir v. Ala.
Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("Government
expression [is] unprotected by the First Amendment."). See also Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment
protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protections on the
Government.") (emphasis in original).
143. The right of assembly and the right to petition government could also be involved in
public colleges and universities, but are not implicated in the cases considered in this article.
144. See CENTLIVRES, supra notes 8, 17, 30 and accompanying text.
145. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 257 ("Why the First Amendment protects administrative
activities at some remove from teaching and scholarship has yet to be adequately justified."). See

also id. at 312 (distinguishing between speech and institutional decision-making).

For a

thoughtful effort to establish some nexus between the First Amendment and academic decisionmaking, see Darlene C. Goring, Affirmative Action and the FirstAmendment: The Attainment of a
Diverse Student Body is a PermissibleExercise of Institutional Autonomy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV.
591 (1999).

146.

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

The Court has not to date

receded from this position. See generally Hiers, supra note 7, at 35-109.

147. Also, arguably, the right of the people to assemble or petition government for redress of
grievances. See supra note 143 and text accompanying note 137.
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cannot reasonably be construed as speech.
C. Public Colleges and Universities are Not Persons
Implicit in the First Amendment is the understanding that "the freedom of
speech" inheres in citizens or the people. The Assembly and Petition Clauses refer
explicitly to "the right of the people." 148 By virtue of its "incorporation" into the
Fourteenth Amendment, rights protected against state intrusion under the First
Amendment necessarily are those of "persons":"[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
149
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
State governments are not persons. The Supreme Court has not intimated that it
is prepared to regard either state governments or state agencies as persons for First
and Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 150 States and state agencies, including
public colleges and universities, may have important or even compelling interests.
State interests may be "balanced" against asserted constitutional rights of persons;
but such interests, themselves, do not have constitutional status. To date, in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence, public colleges and universities have not been
considered persons, and consequently, are not eligible to enjoy First Amendment
protections or rights.
D. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Government Speech
The Supreme Court has discussed government speech on several occasions.
Some cases referred specifically to speech by "the university." In such cases,

148. See supratext accompanying note 137.
149. See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
150. Early in the twentieth century, the Court decided that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from taxing foreign corporations at different rates than
they taxed domestic corporations. See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); and Wheeling Steel v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562
(1949). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (arguably
recognizing private corporations as persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment):
The First Amendment ... serves significant societal interests. The proper question
therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the state law criminalizing banks' and business corporations' expenditures for
the purpose of influencing referendum proposals] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.
Id. at 776. Evidently, the Bellotti Court, like the Court in the corporation tax cases, wished to
side-step the problematic task of analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment's "person" limitation in
order to reach what it considered a desirable social policy result. Thus, for certain purposes,
private sector corporations have been deemed "persons" under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
See also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Sen's., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978)
(municipalities may be liable as "persons" for purposes of actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
Although
voluntary
associations,
for
example
the
NAACP,
may invoke the First Amendment on behalf of their members, such analysis is
beyond the scope of this article.
See NAACPv.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
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government activity was challenged by private individuals asserting First
Amendment rights.
In none of these cases did the Court attribute any
countervailing First Amendment interests to the government or to government (or
public university) speech. The most recent such cases were Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth 151 and Rosenberger v. Rector and
152
Visitors of the University of Virginia.
In Southworth, the Court considered a First Amendment claim by students at the
University of Wisconsin who objected to a mandatory student activity fee used, in
part, to support student organizations engaged in "political or ideological"
speech.1 53 The Court upheld the University's imposition of the fee, noting that the
University "exacts the fee ...for the sole purpose of facilitating the free and open
exchange of ideas by, and among, its students. '154 Inasmuch as the University had
disclaimed any of the speech in question as its own, the Court stated:
[W]e do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to
ensure responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome
First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under
the principle that the government can speak for itself. If the challenged
speech here were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its
officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on
the premise that the government itself is the speaker. That is not the
155
case before us.
In effect, the Southworth Court held that the University could support a program
that advanced the First Amendment of others; but that was not the same as saying
that the University itself had a First Amendment speech interest.1 56 Had the
government (or the University) paid for and thereby implicitly endorsed any
particular student speech, it would have been deemed the speaker-but in that case
its speech would have been analyzed under principles other than the First
Amendment. For analysis of cases where "government" or "the university" (or its
officers) are speakers, the Southworth Court referred to its earlier decisions in Rust
158
v. Sullivan157 and Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington.

151. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
152. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
153. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221, 227.

154. Id. at 229.
155. Id. "The case we decide here.., does not raise the issue of the government's right, or,
to be more specific, the state-controlled University's right, to use its own funds to advance a
particular message." Id.

156. The Court explained:
The University may determine that its mission is well served if students have the
means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social,
and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall. If the
University reaches this conclusion, it is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain
an open dialogue to these ends.
Id. at 233.
157. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
158. 461 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1983). See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229, 235.
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Neither Rust nor Regan referred specifically to government or public university
speakers. Apparently the Southworth Court cited these cases because, in both, the
government was said to have authority to develop and justify programs based on
159
social policy choices, even though some citizens benefited while others did not.
In Rust, the Court upheld federal law and agency regulations that prohibited
Title X program fund recipients from "counseling, referral, and the provision of
160
information regarding abortion as a method of family planning."'
The challenged regulations implement the statutory prohibition by
prohibiting counseling, referral, and the provision of information
regarding abortion as a method of family planning. They are designed
to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed. The Title
X program is designed not for prenatal care, but to encourage family
planning.... This is not a case of the Government "suppressing a
dangerous idea," but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its
employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope. 16'
Perhaps the Southworth Court conceived the government's choice of family
childbirth, and the establishment of a program to implement that choice as

"speech."1 62

In Regan, Taxation with Representation of Washington ("TWR"), a nonprofit
corporation, challenged the Internal Revenue Service Code section denying taxexempt status to organizations that substantially engage in attempts to influence
legislation. 63 TWR contended that this section violated its First Amendment
speech rights. 164 What Southworth characterized as government speech in this
case evidently referred to Congress' decision to enact this provision of the Code as
it chose:
The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible
contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny
TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby.
Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public
159. "The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes
or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable
that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and
defend its own policies." Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
160. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
161. Id.at 193-94.
162. The Rust Court determined:
Here the Government is exercising the authority it possesses.., to subsidize family
planning services which will lead to conception and childbirth, and declining to
"promote or encourage abortion."
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be
in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of the other.
Id. at 193.
163. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.
164. Id. at 541-42.
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moneys. 165
Perhaps the Southworth Court considered that Regan dealt with government speech
in view of Congress' legislative process, which necessarily would have involved
legislators engaging in written and spoken deliberations, and voting.
Rosenberger suggests a way in which the government (or "the University")
itself might more obviously be identified as "speaker": Where the government in
effect sponsors particular speech, or at any rate, gives the appearance of adopting
it. Wide Awake Productions ("WAP") was one of many campus student groups
eligible to have certain types of expenses paid from the University's Student
Activities Fund and periodically published a magazine intended to provide "a
166
The
Christian perspective on both personal and community issues."
cover
printing
to
for
funds
request
WAP's
denied
Council
University's Student
costs on the ground that the publication constituted a "religious activity."'1 67 The
Dean of Students signed a letter in which the University's Student Activities
Committee sustained the denial. 168 WAP, and various students associated with it,
sued in federal district court claiming violation of their First Amendment and other
constitutional rights. 169 The Court held that the University's policy abridged the
WAP students' right of free speech. 170 Its analysis turned on whether the
University was speaking-in which case it might regulate speech either "when it is
the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message"; 171 or
whether "the University... instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers."' 72 In the latter situation, viewpoint restrictions are
improper; and in this case, the Court held, the viewpoint restrictions violated
73
petitioners' First Amendment free speech right. 1
As to the "principles" controlling the University's own speech, the Rosenberger
Court cited two of its earlier cases, Westside Community Board of Education v.
Mergens 74 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.175 Neither of these cases

165. Id.at 545.
166. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-26 (1995).
167. Id. at 827.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.at 845-46.
171. Id.at 833. The Court cited Rust, stating that there it had said, "the government... used
Id.
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program."
Subsequently, the Third Circuit construed Rosenbergerto mean that in such matters as disputes
with administration about curriculum and even assigning grades, a university professor had no
First Amendment rights because, since the professor was an agent of the university, the university
was the speaker. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998); Brown v.
Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001). In neither of these cases did the court say that the
university was entitled to First Amendment protection. This article does not consider whether the
Third Circuit correctly held that faculty members in these cases had no First Amendment speech
or academic freedom interests.
172. Id. at 834.
173. Id.at 834, 837.
174. 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
175. 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
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involved universities, but apparently the Court thought the "principles" indicated
were applicable to the analysis of government speech in higher education.
In Mergens, Bridget Mergens and other public high school students had been
denied permission to form a Christian club that would have had the same status
and privileges as other school student clubs. 176 The students claimed violation of
their rights under the Equal Access Act, and the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses. 177 The Court found that the school had violated the Act, and so did not
reach the students' First Amendment claim. 178 Nevertheless, in dicta, the Court
addressed the question of "government speech" in the context of the Religion
Clauses:
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support
student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis....
The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
79
censor is not complicated. 1
Whatever government speech might have been involved had the school endorsed
this club or the viewpoint of its members, the Court found no Establishment Clause
180
violation on these facts.
In Kuhlmeier, the Court considered whether public school authorities might
censor student "speech" in the form of student articles intended for publication in a
newspaper, production of which had been found to be "part of the educational
curriculum" and a "regular classroom activity," 181 without infringing upon the
students' First Amendment rights. The Court found no violation in these
circumstances. In Kuhlmeier, as in Rust and Regan, the Court did not refer to or
otherwise mention government speech or the government as speaker. It did refer
182
to government--or a public school's-sponsorshipof particular student speech.
The Court focused on the question of "educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the schools."' 183 It concluded: "It is only when the decision to

176.

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 233.

177. Id.
178. Id.
at248-53.
179. Id.
at 250 (internal citations omitted).
180. "To the extent a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is
not an endorsement of the views of the club's participants, students will reasonably understand
that the school's official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than
endorsement of, religious speech." Id. at 251 (internal citation omitted).

181. Kuhlmeier,484 U.S. at 268.
182. The Court held that the newspaper was not a public forum, but rather was intended "as a
supervised learning experience for journalism students," id. at 270, and that school officials were,
therefore, "entitled to regulate [its contents] in any reasonable manner." Id.
183. Id.at 271.
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censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of
student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so
directly and sharply implicated as to require judicial intervention to protect
184
students' constitutional rights."'
In all of these cases, the Court stated, at any rate, in retrospect, that it was or had
been discussing principles relating to situations where the government was
speaker. Yet in none of these cases did the Court even hint that government
speech might be entitled to First Amendment protection. Perhaps it can be
assumed that the Court was aware of the constitutional difficulties that would arise
85
were it to do so.'
E. Significant Semantic and Conceptual Distinctions
In the cases considered so far, a number of terms are used interchangeably,
often imprecisely. It is suggested here that academic freedom and institutional
autonomy are not identical concepts. Academic freedom normally is understood to
refer to the expressive freedom of individual faculty, 186 while autonomy normally
refers to the understanding that courts should defer to policies and decisions by
educational institutions and those acting on their behalf, absent countervailing
constitutional or statutory considerations. Ever since Bakke, lower federal courts
and even occasionally Supreme Court Justices have confused, or mingled so as to
become indistinguishable, a number of significant conceptual categories that
instead should be carefully distinguished.
Academic freedom is both an educational and a social policy value in many
settings other than in public colleges and universities-notably, for example, in
private educational institutions. t 87 In public colleges and universities, certain types
of faculty expression may be considered within the scope of academic freedom,
and also within the protection of the First Amendment. But not everything such
faculty say or do is necessarily so protected. For instance, where faculty are acting
88
as agents for their institutions, faculty may in effect be acting as government.
Faculty speech that constitutes government speech or action therefore may not be
sheltered under the First Amendment. Whether faculty speech in these conditions
should, nevertheless, be protected as an exercise of academic freedom favored by
sound social or public policy is an important question, but one not considered in
this article.
Institutional autonomy, on the other hand, has no discernible basis in the First
Amendment or other constitutional language. Nevertheless, courts may well defer
to institutional autonomy-that is, as many put it, to decisions involving educators'

184. Id. at 273 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
185. See supra Parts IIA-C.
186. This article does not attempt to discuss, much less, define, the extent to which students
and school, college, or university administrators might also have academic freedom interests. See
supra note 6.
187. See, e.g., discussions of academic freedom cited supra note 6.
188. See supra Part II.A., particularly text accompanying note 140.
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expertise in matters of academic policy. 189 In public colleges and universities,
such decisions may well constitute state action, and thus be subject to challenge on
constitutional grounds. When such challenges arise, courts confront the question
whether the public institutions'- thus the states'- interests are so important as
matters of social policy, as to "outweigh" or be accorded priority over the
constitutional claims at issue. Courts' analyses can only be confused by injection
of language as to some putative First Amendment basis for either institutional
academic freedom or institutional autonomy.
None of the Justices or judges who characterized institutional academic
freedom as a constitutional or First Amendment right apparently considered it
necessary to examine or explain the constitutional basis for such right. Possibly
they were unaware that the Supreme Court language which they read as
recognizing such a right was to be found only in concurring opinions and dicta.
Justice Powell, perhaps without reflection, declared in Bakke that the "four
essential freedoms" mentioned in Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence
"constituted academic freedom."' 90 Lower courts, relying on such language in
Sweezy and Bakke, apparently failed to appreciate that the language was to be
found only in concurring opinions, and therefore lacked binding authority. Later,
in its Notre Dame Du Lac opinion, the Seventh Circuit panel mistakenly, and
perhaps inadvertently, at any rate, without constitutional analysis, designated what
other courts had called an educational institution's "academic privilege" against
disclosure an "academic freedom privilege."' 191
Surprisingly few of the judicial opinions considered in this article actually
contend specifically that what they call institutional academic freedom is grounded
in the Constitution or the First Amendment. 192 Other opinions that identify or
allude to institutional academic freedom do not specifically so contend. 193 In these
latter cases, the judges may have recognized that institutional academic freedom
could not be based on the First Amendment, and instead, intended to indicate that
in their view, institutionalautonomy in matters requiring educational expertise
should be honored, where possible, as an important social or public policy value.

189. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 71-74, 94-105, and infra notes 195, 269, and
text accompanying notes 225, 233.
190. See supra text accompanying note 31. Cf supra note 10, and text accompanying notes
7-11.

191. See supra note 79 and text accompanying notes 78-81.
192. Those that do include Justice Powell, concurring in Bakke, supra text accompanying
notes 37-47; the Seventh Circuit in Notre Dame Du Lac, supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text; possibly Piarowski, supra text accompanying notes 86-93; probably Shelton v. Trustees of
Indiana University., 891 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1989); Feldman, supra text accompanying note 108;
and the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky, supra text accompanying notes 132-35. Also, perhaps, the
Court in Ewing, though the Ewing Court evidently was referring either to faculty academic

freedom or to institutional autonomy. See supra text accompanying notes 94-105.
193. See, e.g., Cooper,supra text accompanying notes 65-70; Justice Stevens' concurrence
in Widmar, supra text accompanying and following notes 71-74; Dow, supra text accompanying
and following notes 75-77; possibly Piarowski, supra text accompanying notes 86-93; Osteen v.
Henley, 13 F.3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993); Weinstein, supra note 107 and accompanying text; Webb v.
Bd. ofTrs., 167 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 1999).
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In effect, this is what Justice Stevens did say in his footnote dictum in Ewing,
1 94
where he referred to "autonomous decision-making by the academy itself."'
Institutional academic autonomy in matters requiring educational expertise may
well be an important public policy value. No known constitutional theory could
immunize actions by public colleges and universities from judicial review. As a
matter of social policy, however, courts may well leave academic decisions that
call for the professional expertise of faculty and administrators to such educators,
unless their actions conflict with constitutional, statutory, or other law. Courts can
respect the importance of institutional autonomy as a matter of sound public policy
without placing that autonomy upon some sort of imaginary constitutional
pedestal. 195 Perhaps those courts that mislabeled institutional autonomy as
institutional academic freedom had something of the sort in mind. If so, however,
it is odd that none of the opinions undertook the kind of constitutional balancing
analysis appropriate when social or public policy values or state interests conflict
with specific constitutional rights. Instead, these opinions generally seem to
assume that institutional academic freedom, once invoked, can automatically
cancel out or outweigh faculty members' First Amendment academic freedom
rights.
Characterizing institutional autonomy as "academic freedom" is not only
careless use of language, but also a source of serious confusion in the courts. As
shown in many of the cases considered in this article, it is often unclear whether
the courts mean to say that what they call institutional academic freedom is a First
Amendment right, or a public policy value. As it is, the concept or doctrine of
"institutional academic freedom" has taken on a life of its own, floating above or
beyond constitutional analysis, as if it were derived from some sort of transcendent
higher law.
Judicial opinions that treat institutional academic freedom as a First
Amendment right or value invariably fail to explain how it could be connected to
or grounded upon that Amendment. Conversely, judicial opinions that seem to
regard institutional academic freedom as an important public policy value or state
interest usually fail to explain how this important, but non-constitutional, value is
to be appraised and balanced against First Amendment academic freedom claims
by individual faculty. 196 The fog of confusion that surrounds the concept of
194. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105, and infra note 195. See also Feldman,
where Judge Easterbrook referred to a "university's academic independence," stating, without
explanation, however, that such independence "is protected by the Constitution." See supra text
accompanying note 106. See also infra note 269.
195. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ("When judges
are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should
show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."); id. at 226 ("[Federal courts are
unsuited] to evaluate the substance of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members
of public educational institutions."); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1978)
(same, as to evaluation of university curriculum). See also Justice Stevens' concurrence in
Widmar, supra text accompanying notes 71-74. See also Doherty v. Southern Coll. of
Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1988) (as to degree requirements).
196. Apart from the anomalous position taken by the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky, all other
courts, judges, and Justices appear to acknowledge that, at any rate, since Keyishian, the Court
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institutional academic freedom derives mainly from judicial failure to distinguish
between individual faculty's or teacher's academic freedom, which the Supreme
Court long since declared a "special concern of the First Amendment,"' 197 and
institutional autonomy in matters involving educational expertise.
Such
institutional autonomy is, by its nature, a social or public policy value which could
well be deemed an important, or even, perhaps, under proper circumstances, a
compelling state interest; but it has no entitlement to First Amendment protection.
The Court had the opportunity to underscore these distinctions and so clear away
the fog surrounding these concepts when it took up Grutter v. Bollinger.198
III. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER: INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM -

A FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHT OR A PUBLIC POLICY VALUE?

In 1992, the University of Michigan Law School ("Law School") faculty
adopted an admissions program intended to achieve an ethnically diverse student
body through means that would be constitutionally permissible within standards
intimated by the Court in Bakke. 199 The program was particularly intended to
attract "students from groups which have been historically discriminated against,
like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this
commitment might not be represented in [the Law School's] student body in
meaningful numbers. '20 0
The district court held that the Law School's
consideration of race and ethnicity in connection with this program violated both
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.201 The Sixth Circuit reversed, and upheld the Law School's
20 2
admissions program as acceptable under Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.
A. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis
The Sixth Circuit concluded that "the Law School has a compelling state
interest in achieving a diverse student body. '20 3 In its analysis, the court cited
Justice Powell's reference to language from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in
Sweezy: "Justice Powell recognized that a diverse student body promotes an
has recognized individual faculty academic freedom as a First Amendment right. See generally
Hiers, supra note 7, at 35-109.
197. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
198. 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). This article does not take a position as to the Court's holding,
but rather focuses on its language regarding institutional academic freedom, autonomy, and the
First Amendment.
199. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735-38 (6th Cir. 2002) (opinion by Martin, J.),
aff'd, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).

200.

Id. at 737.

201. Id. at 735. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
202. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 735-52. Applying Marks analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded
that it was bound by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Id. at 739-42. As to Marks analysis, see
supra note 18 and text accompanying and following notes 56-61.
203. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 742. The court also found that the Law School's admissions
program was sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at 749-51.
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atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation' that is 'essential to the
quality of higher education.' ' 204 The Sixth Circuit's opinion consistently identifies
the Law School's-and the state's interest-in student body diversity in terms of
public policy considerations. It refers, for instance, to "the merits of student body
diversity," 205 or the goal of "achieving a diverse student body," 206 or "an interest in
academic diversity. '20 7 The Sixth Circuit did not even refer to, much less discuss,
any claim to academic freedom or other putative First Amendment values or
interests that might have been asserted on behalf of the Law School or its
faculty .208
B. Party and Amicus Briefs Before the Supreme Court
Even though the Sixth Circuit made no holdings as to possible academic
freedom or First Amendment issues, some of the numerous briefs filed with the
Supreme Court following its grant of Grutter's petition for writ of certiorari did
so. 209 Perhaps significantly, Respondents Bollinger, other University of Michigan
officers, and the University's Board of Regents, did not not claim that the Law
School's admissions policy could or should be protected under either academic
freedom or the First Amendment.2 1 0 Grutter, notwithstanding, contended that the
Law School's First Amendment rights to academic freedom and/or autonomy were
21t
the core issues before the Court.
204. Id. at 738 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
(quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J. concurring))).
The expression "essential to the quality of higher education" evidently was the Sixth Circuit's
own paraphrase; it does not appear in either Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy or Justice Powell's
Bakke concurrence.
205. Id. at 739.
206. Id.at 742.
207. Id at 752.
208. At the district court level, the Law School had moved to stay the court's injunction
prohibiting it "from using race as a factor in its admissions decisions," arguing, inter alia, that its
enforcement would infringe "their First Amendment rights to academic freedom and the pursuit
of educational goals." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874, 875, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Without further comment on this point, the district court stated: "In any event, the equal
protection rights of all applicants to be considered for admission without regard to their race
clearly outweighs the First Amendment rights claimed by the law school." Id.
209. The petition was granted Dec. 2, 2002. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
Over one hundred amici briefs were filed subsequently, many of them on behalf of multiple
individuals and organizations, the majority in support of respondents Bollinger et al.
210. See Bollinger et al., Brief in Opposition, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct.
2325 (2003) (No. 02-241), and Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al., Grutter (No. 02-241).
211. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Griater (No. 02-241) ("Covering the
diversity rationale with arguments about 'academic freedom' does not offer it legitimacy under
the Constitution ... : This Court has never held that educational institutions have a First
Amendment right to practice race discrimination in admissions."). See also Petitioner's Reply
Brief on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("[T]he question presented by
this case. .. is whether the particular justification put forth by the Law School-achieving racial
diversity through the purported exercise of 'academic freedom'-is one that rises to the level of a
compelling interest."). See also Petitioner's Opening Brief at 23-26, Grutter (No. 02-241)
(arguing that no other Justices joined in Justice Powell's endorsement of institutional academic
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Some of the amici briefs in support of the Respondents Bollinger et al. also
addressed these issues, contending that the Law School's admissions policy was
within its First Amendment academic freedom or autonomy interest. 2 12 Several
briefs included one or more of the customary misstatements as to Sweezy,
Keyishian, and Bakke. For instance, one brief cited Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence for the proposition: "Policy making in higher education.., enjoys a
greater degree of judicial deference because of academic freedoms rooted in the
First Amendment. '2 13 Neither Justice Frankfurter's concurrence nor the excerpt
quoted therein from The Open Universitiesmentioned either academic freedom or
the First Amendment. At least two briefs quoted Justice Powell's rendition of
Keyishian214 apparently unaware that the significant language "to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples" derived not from
Keyishian, but from Justice Powell's own thinking. 215 Several briefs made
erroneous, or at best questionable, statements concerning Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke. For instance, in her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner stated that
in Bakke Justice Powell "found only one [of the Davis program's objectives] to be
sufficiently compelling: an interest in 'academic freedom' derived from the First
Amendment. '2 16 Actually, the only interest Justice Powell found "compelling"
was "the interest of diversity ... in the context of a university's admissions
program. '217 An amicus brief declared: "Justice Powell's opinion is controlling
with regard to its statements that rely on the First Amendment's protections for
academic freedom because it garnered the support from four Justices of the
Brennan plurality. '218 In actuality, none of the other Justices in Bakke either
subscribed to Parts IV-D and V-A of Justice Powell's opinion, or themselves even
mentioned academic freedom or the First Amendment.
The several briefs considered in this article illustrate the need for the kinds of
semantic and conceptual distinctions noted above in Part II.E. Again, the terms
freedom in Bakke.).
212. See Brief of Michigan Governor Granholm, supra note 100. See also Brief of the
American Educational Research Association, the Association of American Colleges and
Universities, and the American Association for Higher Education as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 11, Grutter (No. 02-24 1). Some amici who might have been expected to make
the same argument, did not do so. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on
Education and 53 Other Higher Education Organizations in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No.
02-24 1), and Brief of the School of Law of the University of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae in
support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), which made no mention of the Fourth Circuit's
discussion of institutional academic freedom in Urofsky, supra text accompanying notes 124-36.
Amici briefs filed by the United States in support of Petitioner did not discuss these issues either.
See Briefqs] for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Grutter
(No. 02-241).
213. Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al., supra note 212, at 15.
214. See supra note 36.
215. Petitioner's Response Brief to Petition for Certiorari by Respondents Kimberly James et
al., at 23, Grutter (No. 02-241); Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al., supra note 210, at 28
Grutter (No. 02-241).
216. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supranote 211, at 18.
217. See supra text accompanying note 53.
218. Brief of Michigan Governor Granholm, supra note 100, at 3 n.2.
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"academic freedom" and university "autonomy" are often used as synonyms or
2 19
otherwise imprecisely.
Some briefs carefully avoid such confusion, and refer consistently to the social
policy value of institutional autonomy and related concerns. These briefs make no
effort to invoke either academic freedom or the First Amendment in support of the
Law School's admissions program. Most notable in this regard are the briefs of
Bollinger, et al. in Opposition to the Petition for Grant of Certiorari, and their
Respondents' Brief. In the former, after discussing several educational and
societal benefits resulting from ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom, the
brief concluded:
Against this backdrop, law schools surely must have the autonomy and
discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race in our society,
and preparing their students to function effectively in multiracial
environments and as advocates for racial justice. . after graduation, are
220
critically important aspects of their institutional missions.
Similarly, the Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education and 53
Other Higher Education Organizations in Support of Respondents argued
consistently that courts-and other branches of government-should exercise
"forbearance" with regard to matters of educational policy and respect the
autonomy of colleges and universities. 221 In support of this argument, these amici
cited not only the classic Dartmouth College case, but also several other nineteenth
and early twentieth century Court decisions, none of which involved academic
223
222
The amici also cited Sweezy, Horowitz,
freedom or First Amendment claims.
Bakke, and Ewing as instances where the Court exercised such forbearance. 224 As
to Ewing, the amici observed: "The Court concluded that academic judgments
'made daily by faculty members ... require an "expert evaluation of cumulative
information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking."' '225 The amici did not suggest that any of these

219. See id. at 3 ("It is this educational autonomy, conferred by... the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution... that the Governor seeks to uphold by filing this amicus brief.").
See also id. at 12-13 ("In cases such as Sweezy, Griswold, Keyishian, Bakke, and Ewing, this
Court has charged a clear and consistent course of according deference to the academic freedom
and autonomy of universities."). See also Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., at 31,
Grutter (No. 02-241) ("Justice Powell was concerned to protect the autonomy of the
universities .. "). Justice Powell's Bakke opinion did not mention university autonomy.
220. Bollinger et al., Brief in Opposition, supra note 210, at 20. Likewise in Bollinger et al.,
Respondent's Brief, after reviewing various indications "that diversity has compelling
educational benefits," id at 21-25, Respondents concluded: "Against this backdrop, law schools
need the autonomy and discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race in our society and
legal system, and preparing their students to function effectively as leaders after graduation, are
critically important aspects of their institutional missions." Id. at 25.
221. Brief of American Council on Education et al., supra note 212, at 2.
222. Id. at 2, 5-6.
223. Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
224. Brief of American Council on Education et al., supra note 212, at 6-8, 11-12.
225. Id. at 8 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (quoting
Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90)).
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cases stood for the proposition that public colleges and universities themselves
were entitled to First Amendment protection. These amici made no mention at all
of the First Amendment. Instead, they argued, in effect, that courts should defer to
college and university educators' beliefs and statements that student diversity is
important not only to the fulfillment of the mission or purpose of higher education,
but also in order to achieve various other important social policy values. 226 Thus
the amici concluded: "Government has a Compelling Interest in the Quality of
'227
Higher Education.
Most of the other briefs in support of Respondents likewise urged the Supreme
Court to consider the social policy values that were or would be served by diverse
student bodies in public colleges and universities. 228 None of these briefs argued
that such social policy values or benefits were in any way contingent upon
colleges' or universities' purported entitlement to First Amendment interests of
any sort.
Thus, among the possible issues confronting the Court were the questions of
whether some or all of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was controlling; and if so,
what it meant; whether the Court should attribute to public colleges and
universities themselves some kind of First Amendment interest in either academic
freedom or autonomy; whether-apart from First Amendment considerationsdeference to institutional autonomy was appropriate; and whether student diversity
itself should be considered a compelling interest, and if so, whether it should be
deemed to outweigh Grutter's Equal Protection interest.
C. The Supreme Court's Holdings and Analysis
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment in late June 2003,
clearly answering the last two questions just posed above in the affirmative: "In
summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's
narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling state
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body. '229 The issue before the Court was: "[W]hether the use of race as a factor in

226. The amici stated:
Diversity is basic to higher education's main purposes: to enable students to lead 'the
examined life'; to ready them to maintain the robust democracy in which we live; and
to prepare them to function in the national and global economy. These aims entail
breaking down barriers that isolate the student from the world he or she needs to know.
Brief of American Council on Education et al., supra note 212, at 3. As to other social policy
values said to derive from student diversity, see id. at 13-29.
227. Id. at 29.
228. See, e.g., Brief of the University of North Carolina Law School, supra note 212, at 1012; Brief of Michigan Governor Granholm, supra note 100, at 5; Brief of the American
Educational Research Association et al., supra note 212, at 2-3, 5-7, 12-13, 15-19. See also the
other amici briefs cited by the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, ___, 123 S. Ct 2325,
2340 (2003), advocating various social policy values or benefits driving from student body
diversity. See also infra note 236.
229. Grutter, 539 U.S. at __, 123 S. Ct. at 2347. See also id at 2339 ("Today, we hold that
the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.").
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230
student admission by the University of Michigan Law School... is unlawful.
The Law School had not claimed any First Amendment or academic freedom
interest; the question of institutional academic freedom was not before the Court,
and the Court did not decide that question. 23 1 Consequently, it might have been
expected that the Court would not find it necessary to discuss these issues.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion by Justice O'Connor considered these
matters in dicta. The Court's holding, which upheld the Law School's admission
program and procedures, does not mention institutional academic freedom or
institutional First Amendment rights. 232 The Court, however, observed that its
decision was made with due respect to institutional autonomy:
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict
for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that
lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today
is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed

limits. 233

For reasons that need not be considered, the Court concluded that the Law
School's goal of achieving student body diversity constituted a compelling
interest. 234 By virtue of its being a state university law school, this interest was

found to be a compelling state interest. 235 Although the Court does not say so
explicitly, it appears that the Court understood such interest to be an important
social or public policy value. 236 The notion of institutional academic freedom or
First Amendment interests does not enter into the Court's discussion as to the Law
School's (or state's) compelling interest in student diversity.
230. Id.at 2331.
231. The question was raised in Petitioner's briefs, and in certain amicus briefs, most
notably, that of the Governor of Michigan, whose brief was devoted entirely to arguing on behalf
of the Law School's academic freedom. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. The Court might also have mentioned
233. Grutter, 539 U.S. at
statutory limits, for example, those imposed by Title VII and Title IX.
234. "Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body
is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's
Id. at 2339. This article does not inquire as to the cogency of the Court's
proper mission ....
conclusion that student body diversity constituted a compelling state interest and that the Law
School's admissions program was narrowly tailored, or the Court's determination that its interest
in student diversity outweighed Grutter's equal protection claim.
235. Somewhat curiously, although noting that "the Law School [asked the Court] to
recognize, in the context of higher education, a compelling state interest in student body
diversity," id. at 2338, the Court regularly refers to the Law School's compelling interest in
student diversity. For purposes of constitutional analysis, of course, the Law School was (and is)
"government," namely, a state agency operating with delegated powers. See supra Part II.A.
236. See id at 2340, where the Court describes numerous benefits to society purportedly
deriving from student body diversity, some of which had been suggested by various amici curiae:
such as not only better "learning outcomes," but also "break[ing] down racial stereotypes," better
preparation "for an increasingly diverse workforce and society," better preparation of students "as
professionals," developing "skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace," and
improving "the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security."
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The majority's analysis began with a review of the Court's earlier discussion in
Bakke regarding public universities' or the government's use of race in admissions
decisions. 237 In this connect, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, referred
specifically to academic freedom, but without stating whether she was thinking of
the academic freedom of individual faculty, or the purported academic freedom of
public academic institutions of higher learning:
With the important proviso that "constitutional limitations protecting
individual rights may not be disregarded," Justice Powell grounded his
analysis in the academic freedom that "long has been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment." [quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312, 314] Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less than the
"'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure'
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples." [quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S.
at 603)] In seeking the "right to select those students who will
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,"' a university
seeks "to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the
fulfillment of its mission." [quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313]238
It is unclear whether the majority was aware that the language as to "the ideas and
mores" of diverse students was not to be found in Keyishian, but rather had been
added by Justice Powell, himself, in a part of his opinion that was joined by no
other Justice. 239 Apparently the majority meant to say that Justice Powell had
determined that a university's right to select students who would contribute to such
"exposure" and "exchange" was somehow grounded in the First Amendment. The
majority undoubtedly was aware that, as in the case of the Davis Medical School's
admissions policy challenged in Bakke, the Michigan Law School's admission
program had been created by its faculty. 240 If so, the majority may have been
thinking that the Law Schoolfaculty's action in establishing the program was to be
understood as an exercise of its academic freedom which was somehow protected
under the First Amendment. In any event, the Grutter Court's discussion of
academic freedom is dicta because its stated holding is based instead on its finding
that the Law School (or the state) had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse
student body. 241 The Grutter Court did not say that the state or the Law School
had either an important or a compelling interest in the University's or the Law
School's academic freedom or autonomy.
Immediately following its initial discussion of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion,
the Court pointed to the problems experienced by lower courts in determining

237. Id. at 2335-38.
238. Id. at 2336.
239. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. On the one hand, the Court's statement
properly credits Justice Powell with emphasizing the quoted language as to "the ideas and mores"
of diverse students; on the other hand, it appears to take at face value Justice Powell's rendition
which makes this language appear to derive from Keyishian.
240. See supratext accompanying notes 39, 199.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 230-36.

2004]

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

whether that opinion, which had been joined by no other Justice, was binding
authority under Marks.242 The Grutter Court, of course, was not bound by Bakke,
and so found it unnecessary "to decide whether Justice Powell's opinion [was]
binding under Marks. '243 Instead, the Court invoked its own authority, stating:
"[T]oday, we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions. '244 The Court did not say that it endorsed Justice Powell's comments
regarding institutional academic freedom under the First Amendment. Including a
review of such comments in its discussion was unfortunate, however, in view of
lower courts' occasional tendency to ignore the critical distinction between dicta
and binding authority.
Having bypassed the problem of deciphering Justice Powell's concurring
language in Bakke, and having stated that the state or the Law School "has a
compelling interest" in student body diversity, 245 majority once again, strangely,
reverted to Justice Powell's Bakke comments regarding a First Amendment basis
for institutional authority. Only now, the Court referred to institutional autonomy,
not institutional academic freedom:
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling
state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of
educational autonomy: "The freedom of a university to make its own
246
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
Justice O'Connor and the four subscribing Justices seem to have been unaware that
there were no Court decisions recognizing a First Amendment or other
constitutional basis for educational autonomy.
Actually, Justice Powell's concurrence had not even mentioned institutional
"autonomy." Instead, he had asserted that the "four essential freedoms" referred to
by Justice Frankfurter in his Sweezy concurrence constituted "academic freedom,"
and that such "academic freedom," when invoked by a university claiming "the
right to select students who will contribute ... to the 'robust exchange of ideas"'
was grounded in the First Amendment. 247 Perhaps Justice O'Connor recognized
, 123 S. Ct. at 2337. As to Marks analysis, see supra text
242. Gruter, 539 U.S. at
accompanying and following notes 18, 56-60.
123 S. Ct. at 2337.
243. Grutter, 539 U.S. at _,
244. Id.
245. Id.at 2337, 2338.
246. Id. at 2339 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). See
infra note 248 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter reflects similar
confusion on this point. He wrote: "Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in university
admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a
123 S. Ct. at 2370
university's conception of its educational mission." Grutter, 539 U.S. at _,
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did not cite any cases that might constitute such a
tradition. There was no such tradition or such case law.
247. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13, 315-16. Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence did not
claim that "the four essential freedoms of a university" were grounded on the First Amendment.
His concurrence did not even mention academic freedom or the First Amendment. Compare
comment by Justice Thomas, dissenting in Grutter: "Justice Frankfurter went further, however,
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that in this context institutional academic freedom is better characterized as
institutional autonomy. She evidently considered it unnecessary to explain how
either institutional academic freedom or institutional autonomy could be grounded
in the First Amendment. Apparently she was under the mistaken impression that
prior Court decisions had accorded First Amendment protection to institutional
248
autonomy.
Justice Thomas aptly criticized this lack of explanation in his dissent:
In my view, "it is the business" of this Court to explain itself when it
cites provisions of the Constitution to invent new doctrines-including
the idea that the First Amendment authorizes a public university to do
what would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
majority fails in its summary effort to prove this point. The only source
for the Court's conclusion that public universities are entitled to
deference even within the confines of strict scrutiny is Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell, for his part, relied only on Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy and the Court's decision in [Keyishian
v. Board of Regents] to support his view that the First Amendment
somehow protected a public university's use of race in admissions.
Keyishian provides no answer to the question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions are relaxed when applied to public
249
universities.
The Grutter Court majority's repetition, in dicta, of various erroneous or
misleading statements by Justice Powell in his Bakke concurrence 250 was
unnecessary and unfortunate. It was unnecessary because the Court decided
Grutter by finding that the state's interest in the Law School's student body
diversity was both compelling and narrowly tailored. It was unfortunate because a
majority of the Court, albeit in dicta, seemingly gave credence to the notion that at
some time or other it had held institutional academic freedom, 25 1 or at any rate,

reasoning that the First Amendment created a right of academic freedom that prohibited the
investigation." Grutter, 539 U.S. at __, 123 S. Ct. at 2357 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Scalia, J.).
248. Grutter, 539 U.S. at __, 123 S.Ct. at 2338-39. Insupport of this idea, the Court cited
as authority Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487

(1960); and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). None of these cases involved
academic freedom or First Amendment claims by educational institutions; none of these decisions
held that public colleges or universities are entitled to academic freedom or other First
Amendment rights; and none of these cases concerned student admissions policies. See supra
notes 13-18, 28, 32, 34, 38, and accompanying texts.
249. Grutter, 539 U.S. at __, 123 S.Ct. at 2357 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.)
(internal citations omitted). Justices Thomas and Scalia evidently noticed, as the majority did
not, that when writing in Bakke about academic freedom and the First Amendment, Justice
Powell was expressing only his own views, not those of the Court. In effect, the dissent was
saying, two concurring opinions do not make constitutional law.
250. See supranotes 28, 31, 32, 38, 48, and text accompanying notes 29-51.
251. See supra text accompanying note 238.
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institutional autonomy, 25 2 to be a right somehow sheltered under the First
Amendment. Lower courts that neglect to observe the critical distinction between
dicta and binding authority may now be misled into supposing that the Court
endorsed this notion. The Grutter Court missed a splendid opportunity to correct
the impression that, at some time in the murky past, the Court had somehow
established institutional academic freedom as a constitutionally protected right. By
referring, even if only in dicta, to institutional autonomy as a First Amendment
right, 253 the Court only compounded the confusion.
IV. CONCLUSION

The strange career of The Open Universitiesin South Africa quotation, cited in
Supreme Court concurring opinions and dicta, and eventually in lower federal
court dicta and decisions as standing for the doctrine that the First Amendment
protects institutional academic freedom or autonomy, reveals a remarkable lack of
judicial attention. The doctrine rests entirely upon failure to attend carefully to
language, in particular, failure to distinguish between persuasive authoritynotably, concurrences and dicta-and binding precedent; and between public
policy values or state interests on one hand, and constitutionally protected rights or
interests on the other. The idea that public colleges and universities themselves are
endowed with academic freedom under the First Amendment lacks any
authoritative basis in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and is conceptually flawed.
As to conceptual flaws in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, in summary, the
First Amendment protects persons from governmental intrusion upon rights there
enumerated; it does not protect the government from persons claiming
constitutional violations. The First Amendment protects speech or viewpoint
expression, but not institutional decisions or actions. And while the First
Amendment protects private persons, public colleges and universities are not
persons. 254 Moreover, Supreme Court case law on government speech has never
accorded public colleges or universities themselves First Amendment rights or
255
interests.
Relevant Supreme Court case law began with Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence, in which Frankfurter mentioned neither academic freedom nor the
First Amendment but quoted from a book by South African scholars who urged the
importance of university freedoms or autonomy in an attempt to ward off the South
African government's planned imposition of apartheid. The South African
scholars' public policy concern-highly important in its own setting-had no
relation whatsoever to U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. In any event, as a
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter's observations could have only persuasive
256
authority.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Bakke which designated such university
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra text accompanying note 246.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 137-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 151-85.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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freedoms as "academic freedom" and declared them grounded in the First
Amendment, included a number of misstatements as to prior authority, together
with certain additions and policy statements of his own that were not clearly
identified as such. 257 When concurring-as when dissenting-Justices and judges
are not obliged to work out careful legal theories in support of their positions, and
are relatively free to give expression to public policy values they deem
important. 258 At any rate, Justice Powell did not venture to address the
259
constitutional issues confronting the notion of institutional academic freedom.
An important matter often unnoticed by courts and commentators, moreover, is
that Justice Powell's comments on institutional academic freedom and the First
260
Amendment do not constitute binding authority.
Most, if not all, of the dicta supporting the concept of institutional academic
freedom rests either directly or indirectly on Justice Frankfurter's concurring
26 1
opinion in Sweezy and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Bakke.
Eventually, first in its own dicta and then in certain holdings, the Seventh Circuit,
accepting one or both of these concurrences as authority, extrapolated the further
idea that academic institutions' First Amendment academic freedom could stand as
a barrier against individual faculty's or teacher's assertions of constitutionally
grounded academic freedom rights. 262 Neither Justice Frankfurter's nor Justice
Powell's concurrences had intimated anything of the sort. Completing the picture,
the Fourth Circuit recently declared, en banc, that public colleges and universities
263
may enjoy First Amendment academic freedom, but that faculty do not.
When Justices and judges generate dicta, they seldom feel constrained to
articulate the legal analysis that justifies their pronouncements. Frequently,
questions addressed or commented upon in dicta are not matters that have been
argued at trial level or in briefs or at oral argument on appeal, but rather represent
257. See supratext accompanying notes 29-53.
258. The late Fifth Circuit judge, John Minor Wisdom, shared this observation with the
present writer during conversation at his New Orleans chambers in November 1989. Judge
Wisdom insisted that the Fifth Circuit was a very collegial court, but added that if one wished to
trace its members' social policy or ideological differences, the best place to look for indications
would be en bane dissents and concurrences. Justices and judges often do not bother to take issue
with their colleagues' questionable statements when such statements appear in dissents and
concurrences. Thus somewhat idiosyncratic views as to both law and social policy may remain
uncorrected, yet find their way into the federal reporters. Later readers, including even jurists,
coming across such statements may readily mistake them for more than merely persuasive
authority-particularly if readers are impressed by the writers' prestige, or if the statements seem
pertinent to cases or issues before them.
259. See supraPart II.
260. See supra text accompanying and following notes 54-61. Commentators also
sometimes mistake Justice Stevens' concurrence in Widmar, supra text accompanying notes 6467, for the opinion of the Court.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74, 77 (concurring opinion), 86-105, 107
(dicta), and 124-36. Such dicta and even holdings sometimes also rely on misread Supreme
Court or lower court authority. See supra notes 79, 110, and text accompanying notes 107-12,
133.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 75-112.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 116-36.
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various Justices' or judges' own beliefs as to desirable social or public policy
outcomes or values. 264 Consequently, while legal analysis tends to be neglected,
particular policy preferences remain unchallenged yet incorporated into the
respective federal reporters as opinions of the courts. The total absence of
constitutional analysis in judicial opinions espousing the idea that the First
institutional
academic freedom--or
Amendment protects institutional
autonomy 265-may be accounted for in large part in this way. The absence may
or no support
also be accounted for on the basis that such theory would have little 266
in either the Constitution or in relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Dicta, particularly when emanating from distinguished Justices and judges, can
all too easily mislead busy lower court judges and their clerks. Judicial opinions
often do not distinguish clearly between holdings and dicta, and as every law
student and attorney knows, it is sometimes difficult to tell the one from the other.
Judges and clerks alike may suppose or presuppose that everything they read in
judicial opinions has been carefully researched, reasoned, and decided, and,
therefore, may be relied upon as representing the law of the jurisdiction-if not of
the land. Thus, as has been shown, dicta, along with language in concurring
opinions, can become the basis for later decisional law-without supporting legal
or constitutional analysis ever having been attempted.
Much of the dicta and some of the lower court holdings that refer to institutional
academic freedom can be read as commending institutional autonomy in matters
requiring academic professional expertise as an important policy value in our
society. Such institutional autonomy may indeed be of great benefit, not only to
the institutions in carrying out their educational missions, but also to the larger
society. 267 As was hoped for in the case of the situation that prompted South
African scholars to write The Open Universities,268 deference to autonomy may
serve to afford colleges and universities protection from political pressure or
is
popular prejudice. Yet institutional autonomy remains a public policy value; it269
universities.
and
colleges
public
in
inherent
somehow
right
constitutional
not a

264. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 27-51, 65-77, 92-105, 124-36.
265. See supra Parts I.C-D., III.
266. See supra Part II.
267. See, for example, the excellent discussion of the importance of institutional autonomy
by Goring, supra note 145, at 607-13. Professor Goring suggests that because educational
decision-making is of great importance, in particular, in order to implement affirmative action
programs, such decision-making should be protected by the First Amendment from "unwarranted
constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 613.
268. See supratext accompanying and following notes 7-11.
269. The matter was clearly stated by the First Circuit nearly two decades ago:
Whether a school sets itself up to attract and serve only the best and the brightest
students or whether it instead gears its standards to a broader, more average population,
is a policy decision which, we think, universities must be allowed to set. And matters
such as course content, homework load, and grading policy are core university
concerns, integral to implementation of this policy decision. See Regents of University
of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 ... (1978) (the "four essential freedoms" of
a university are "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study") (quoting
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The Court's Grutter decision could have made this point clear. In fact, the Court
held that the Law School (and the state) had a compelling interest in student body
diversity. The Court did not hold that the Law School or the state had a
compelling, or even important, interest in either institutional academic freedom or
institutional autonomy. Nevertheless, the Grutter Court's references in dicta to
institutional autonomy and institutional academic freedom as First Amendment
interests could confuse lower courts that fail to distinguish between holding and
dicta.
Some important issues remain unresolved. For instance, as has been suggested,
on the occasions when certain Justices referred to universities' invoking First
Amendment academic freedom protections, they may have meant that these
universities did so on behalf of their faculty members who had taken the
challenged actions. 270 On the other hand, as has also been suggested, it is doubtful
whether the First Amendment could be construed to protect actions by faculty
when those faculty are acting as agents of public institutions, and thus also as
agents of the state.271 In such circumstances, courts might nevertheless choose to
defer to the expertise of the educators responsible for challenged decisions out of
respect for institutional autonomy or even the faculty members' academic
freedom. 272 In this situation, institutional autonomy or academic freedom might be
deemed important social policy values, and thus important state interests; but it
remains to be seen whether or how these values or interests could be grounded in
the First Amendment.
Again, as in the Southworth case, 273 courts may properly conclude that a public
college or university may constitutionally provide the conditions for "dynamic"
debate and the airing of wide-ranging viewpoints on all kinds of topics, thereby
promoting First Amendment values clearly appropriate within the Court's holdings
in Sweezy and Keyishian. In such cases, institutions themselves might even be said
to have an obligation to uphold and encourage academic freedom as an essential
part of their educational mission. Institutions providing for and promoting the
exercise of academic freedom would thus serve the purposes of the First
Amendment; but doing so would not qualify the institutions to claim any First
Amendment rights or interests for themselves. Nevertheless, courts may and
Sweeney [sic] v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 ... (1957)).

Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d. 419, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted). Citing Supreme Court case law, the Lovelace court misspelled
Sweezy, neglected to note that the "four essential freedoms" language came from Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence, not from the Court, and did not mention that in this part of his Bakke
opinion Justice Powell was speaking (or writing) only for himself. Nevertheless, the court here
accurately characterized university "freedoms" as policy choices, not as an exercise of "academic
freedom" or some kind of First Amendment right.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40, 100-04, and 240 as to Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Bakke, Justice Stevens' opinion in Ewing, and the majority's language in
Grutter.

271. See supra text accompanying notes 140, 143-47.
272. As mentioned supra note 6, this article does not undertake to define the scope of
academic freedom as a matter of educational or social policy.
273. See supratext accompanying notes 151-58.
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perhaps should defer to institutional policies and programs that serve such
purposes as a matter of good social policy. This appears to be what the Grutter
Court in fact did, even though its quotation of "academic freedom" and "First
Amendment" language from Justice Powell's Bakke opinion to some extent
obscures its analysis.
Perhaps the Supreme Court itself will achieve greater clarity on these questions
in the near future. One or more of the cases in the line of recent Seventh or Fourth
Circuit academic freedom jurisprudence will conceivably come to its attention. In
the meantime, lower federal courts would do well to bear in mind that even though,
in given circumstances, institutional autonomy might be so important a public
policy value that it could be considered at least an important state interest, the
Court has not yet determined that public colleges and universities are entitled to
either academic freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment.
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